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U.S. Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention during the Volcker-Greenspan Era 
 
“I think I have been around too long to be able to give you a precise definition of 
what is a disorderly market. … Disorder to some extent is in the eyes of the 
beholder.”   
Edwin Truman, Director BOG’s International Division,  
15 November 1994 
 
 “I think intervention undermines the credibility of monetary policy by 
introducing some confusion as to what our fundamental objectives are as between 
domestic price stability and exchange rate objectives at particular points in time.  
…  I think some foreign exchange operations could over time undermine public 
support for the Fed’s financial independence, which is the ultimate foundation for 
our credibility.”   
J. Alfred Broaddus, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,  
2-3 July 1996 
 
1.  Introduction 
  After 6 October 1979, through both the Volcker and Greenspan chairmanships, the 
Federal Reserve System underwent a long—sometimes tentative—process of rebuilding its 
credibility.  The FOMC came to focus on an inflation objective, acknowledging an inevitable 
connection between achieving low, stable inflation expectations and maintaining the nation’s 
maximum sustainable economic growth rate.  Over these years, economists increasingly 
recognized the crucial link between central-bank independence and the integrity of monetary 
policy.   
  At the same time, the Federal Reserve underwent a similar learning process with respect 
to foreign-exchange operations, initially concluding that sterilized intervention was largely 
ineffectual but eventually deciding that intervention—even sterilized intervention—could create 
uncertainty about monetary policy.  Between 1981 and 1985, the United States adopted a 
minimalist approach to intervention, but eventually reversed course under pressure from foreign 
governments, U.S. politicians, and some influential economists who continued to view floating 
exchange rates as excessively volatile, vulnerable to destabilizing speculation, and prone to 
serious departures from their fundamentals.  In 1985, the Treasury again adopted an activist 
approach.  The sterilized interventions that followed the Plaza and Louvre accords, at best, fared 
no better than earlier operations.  The movement in dollar exchange rates during these episodes 
seems to reflect changes in monetary policy, not intervention.  At most, intervention gave the 
impression of international cooperation and U.S. concern about dollar exchange rates, but the 
Federal Reserve came to view that impression as very costly.   
  As attitudes about the proper role of monetary policy changed, monetary economists 
increasingly found intervention inconsistent with anchoring inflation expectations.  The Federal 
Reserve’s response to the 19 October 1987 stock-market collapse first highlighted the potential 
for conflict between monetary policy and intervention, but the problem became critical in 1989.  
At that time, the FOMC was tightening, trying to stem a rise in inflation and to consolidate long-
fought gains in its credibility, but the Foreign Exchange Desk, under strong pressure from the 
U.S. Treasury, was buying huge amounts of German marks and Japanese yen and warehousing 
large positions for the Treasury.  At the 3 October 1989 FOMC meeting, opponents of   3 
intervention went beyond perennial doubts about the efficacy of intervention and argued 
forcefully that intervention created uncertainty about the objectives of monetary policy.  A 
central bank cannot credibly anchor inflation expectations and attempt to manage exchange rates, 
particularly when the fiscal authority has primary responsibility for the latter.  Thereafter, the 
Federal Reserve began to back away from foreign-exchange intervention, and since 1995, except 
for one operation against Japanese yen in 1998 and one operation against the euro in 2000, the 
United States has wisely stopped intervening.   
2.  Before Plaza: 1981 - 1985 
  Soon after the Reagan administration formally inaugurated its minimalist intervention 




  During this time, a tightening in U.S. monetary policy, in conjunction with expanding 
federal budget deficits, raised real interest rates in the United States and attracted substantial 
inflows of foreign funds.  While these financial inflows mitigated the traditional, interest-
sensitive crowding out that economists expected from the emerging U.S. policy mix, the 
resulting real dollar appreciation opened U.S. manufacturers to intense foreign competition.  
Confronted with mounting protectionist threats and faced with the criticism of those 
policymakers and academics who still regarded intervention, particularly U.S. intervention, as 
necessary to maintain orderly market conditions, the administration eased back into an activist’s 
intervention role in early 1985, despite evidence that intervention did not offer an independent 
tool for affecting exchange rates (see figures 1 and 2).   
  Between July 1980 and March 1985, the U.S. dollar appreciated nearly 55 percent on a 
nominal trade-weighted basis relative to the currencies of the other major developed countries.  
Over this same time period, the dollar appreciated 89 percent relative to the German mark, the 
United States’ key intervention currency and the linchpin of the European Exchange-Rate 
Mechanism.  Movements against the Japanese yen, which emerged as a second key U.S. 
intervention currency around this time, were more muted.  Between July 1980 and March 1985, 
the dollar appreciated only 17 percent against the yen.  Most of the dollar’s appreciation was on a 
real basis, suggesting a significant deterioration in the competitive position of the U.S. traded-
goods sector.  On a trade-weighted real basis, the dollar appreciated nearly 49 percent between 
mid-1980 and early 1985.   
A tightening of U.S. monetary policy prompted the dollar’s appreciation.  The Federal 
Reserve had initially moved to tighten monetary policy and to eliminate inflation after Paul 
Volcker became chairman in August 1979.
2  At a secret meeting on 6 October 1979, the FOMC 
adopted new operating procedures that attempted to improve the System’s credibility with 
respect to its monetary targets by focusing on a reserve aggregate as an operating target rather 
than on the federal funds rate (see Hetzel 2008, pp. 166-169).
3
The Committee’s initial policy steps towards eliminating inflation proved tentative.  
During the recession of 1980, for example, the System, now under its new operating procedure, 
allowed the federal funds rate to fall sharply, resulting in a negative real federal funds rate in 
mid-1980 (see figures 3 and 4).  After the Board removed credit controls in July 1980, economic 
activity improved, but high long-term bond rates suggested no improvement in inflation 
  The Federal Reserve also raised 
marginal reserve requirements and at the Carter administration’s request, imposed credit controls 
(Schreft 1990).  The economy slipped into recession by January 1980.     4 
expectations.  The Federal Reserve tightened again in 1981 and generally maintained that stance 
despite a serious recession that began in middle of the year and continued through almost all of 
1982.  In mid-1982, the Committee again allowed nominal policy rates to ease somewhat.  In 
part, this was a response to the continuing recession and to a continuing moderation of inflation, 
but an emerging developing country debt crisis also may have contributed to the policy change.
4
Although the federal funds rate generally fell during this pre-Plaza period, the decline 
conformed to the Taylor principle.  As the economy recovered after the 1982 recession, Volcker 
acted to prevent a rise in inflation expectations by keeping the funds rate high and by responding 
to increases in long-term bond rates (Hetzel 2008, pp. 172-179).  The real federal funds rate 
fluctuated around 5.2 percent between 1981 and 1985, which was high by historical standards.   
   
Against the backdrop of tight monetary policy, the Reagan administration entered the 
White House in January 1981, instituting substantial cuts in personal income taxes and increases 
in military expenditures.  The Reagan administration also hoped for cuts in non-defense federal 
spending, but Congress was unwilling to enact these.
5
By 1982, the tight-money-loose-fiscal policy mix had pushed nominal interest rates in the 
United States above those in the other major developed countries, even though many countries 
tried to resist the resulting downward pressures on their own currencies by tightening monetary 
policy, often through non-sterilized interventions (BIS 1983, pp. 67-68) (see figure 5).  In 
addition, the economic recovery from the 1981-82 recession occurred sooner, and remained 
subsequently stronger, in the United States than in most European countries.  The improved 
business outlook, more favorable business taxes, and lower expected inflation improved the real 
return on capital in the United States.  These conditions attracted foreign funds into dollar-
denominated assets.
  Consequently, the federal-budget deficit 
increased from 2½ percent of GDP in FY1981 to 4 percent of GDP in FY1982 and to 6 percent 
of GDP in FY1983.  The federal-budget deficit then remained near 5 percent of GDP over the 
next three fiscal years.   
6
During any period of tight monetary policy and strong economic growth, such an 
expansion of the federal budget deficit might have crowded out private investment and other 
interest-sensitive economic activity.  Yet, in the early 1980s, traditional crowding out did not 
take place.  Fixed investment in the United States fell as a percentage of GDP in 1982, but 
thereafter increased and was higher in 1984 and 1985 than in 1981 or in the late 1970s.  Strong 
foreign financial inflows and the dollar’s appreciation shifted fiscal crowding out from interest-
sensitive sectors of the economy to the traded-goods sector.     
   
Prior to 1985, few in the administration worried about the impact of the strong dollar on 
the traded-goods sector.  They seemed to view crowding out in this sector as better than the 
traditional variety.  The Council of Economic Advisors (1984, pp. 55-57) suggested that the 
investment sector contributed more to potential economic growth than the traded goods sector 
and that higher potential growth eased inflationary pressures.   
The administration actually took steps to encourage foreign financial inflows in the years 
prior to the Plaza Accord.  The Treasury pressured foreign governments, notably Japan, to 
liberalize their financial markets, giving the United States greater access to borrowed funds.  In 
1984, the administration eliminated the withholding tax on interest payments to foreigners who 
invested in U.S. corporate and government bonds.  The Treasury also allowed U.S. corporations   5 
to issue bearer bonds to foreigners and designed new U.S. government bonds to be more 
attractive to foreigners.   
Treasury Secretary Regan interpreted the dollar’s appreciation as an international vote of 
confidence in the administration’s policies (Feldstein 1994, p. 70; Volcker and Gyohten, 1992, p. 
179) and was unwilling to amend the minimalist intervention strategy that Under Secretary of the 
Treasury for Monetary Affairs, Beryl Sprinkel, had introduced in early 1981.
7
  Perhaps to mollify foreign criticism of its minimalist approach, at the Versailles 
Economic Summit on 4-6 June 1982, the United States agreed to a French proposal for a study of 
the G7’s experience with intervention since the inception of generalized floating.  In March 
1983, the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention released their findings, generally 
known as the Jurgensen Report after its chairman (Jurgensen 1983).  
  As the dollar 
appreciated, however, foreign central banks—notably Germany—intervened heavily and 
generally tightened monetary policy in attempts to limit their currencies’ depreciations.  They 
complained about the U.S. policy mix and urged intervention (Destler and Henning 1989, p. 23).  
Foreign central banks, particularly the French, continued to believe that intervention was 
effective.  They maintained that exchange rates frequently deviated from fundamentals and that 
excessive exchange-rate volatility was detrimental both to domestic economic activity and to the 
international adjustment process.  They continued to believe, as they did back in 1973, that U.S. 
intervention, in particular, had an important “psychological” effect on the market (see FOMC 
Minutes 29-30 March 1982, p. 4).    
The Jurgensen Report and Emerging Research 
With a decade of observations, the Jurgensen Report was the first official study of 
intervention.  It confirmed that many G7 participants still had a wary attitude about freely 
floating exchange rates.  They saw the market as inefficient, prone to disorder, and capable of 
serious deviations from fundamentals, by which they often meant current-account balances and 
inflation differentials.   
As a treatise on intervention, however, the Jurgensen Report fell far short.  The report, 
itself, failed to clearly address and answer the most critical question: Did intervention enable 
central banks to systematically pursue an exchange-rate objective independent of their other 
monetary-policy goals?  Its narrative often failed to carefully distinguish between sterilized 
intervention and unsterilized intervention or to isolate intervention from other policy actions.  As 
a result, while the conclusions may have tempered people’s beliefs about the effectiveness (or 
ineffectiveness) of intervention, they could dispel neither an activist’s, nor a non-activist’s 
position.  The imprecision seemed, and probably was, intentional.  To its credit, the Jurgensen 
Report did initiate some serious background studies of intervention, which addressed the critical 
issues more directly, and it opened the door for further academic work (see Henderson and 
Sampson 1983).   
The Jurgensen report found that intervention—presumably both the unsterilized and 
sterilized varieties—had been an effective tool for influencing exchange rates in the short run.  
The report claimed that unsterilized intervention was more effective than sterilized intervention, 
but it failed to discuss the potential conflict with domestic monetary-policy objectives that 
unsterilized intervention could create.  The report also indicated that in the face of persistent 
market pressures, sterilized intervention was ineffective and that “supportive” domestic 
monetary-policy changes were necessary.
8  But, why then undertake sterilized intervention?     6 
Was it not redundant to normal open-market operations?  Many participants asserted that 
sterilized intervention could reinforce the exchange-rate consequences of monetary-policy 
changes, but the Report offered no support for this important contention.  Bonser-Neal et al. 
(1998) would eventually refute this claim.  If, on the other hand, domestic policies were 
inconsistent with exchange-rate objectives, sterilized intervention was, at best, useless.  The 
Jurgensen Report gave a qualified nod to coordinated interventions over unilateral actions and 
eschewed capital controls, which many countries still maintained in their arsenals of exchange-
rate policies (see: Jurgensen 1983, pp. 17-21; see also Henderson and Sampson 1983, pp. 830-
833).  
At about the time of the Jurgensen Report, academic attitudes about foreign-exchange 
intervention were undergoing an important change.  The dominant paradigm for investigating 
sterilized intervention was still the portfolio-balance approach.  Definitions still described 
sterilized intervention as a change in the currency composition of outstanding interest-bearing 
government debt that left the monetary base unchanged (see Jurgensen 1983, p. 6; Rogoff 1984, 
p. 133; Loopesko 1984).  Adams and Henderson  (1983, p. 3), for example, noted the difficulty 
in measuring and testing intervention:  “Many other actions of the financial authorities affect the 
currency composition of net official assets in ways essentially indistinguishable from the effects 
of the traditional proxies [for intervention].”
9
Despite the portfolio-balance approach’s predominance and evidence of a time-varying 
risk premium, the emerging empirical evidence offered little support for an exploitable portfolio-
balance channel.
  This, of course, is all correct, but the emphasis on 
asset composition is only relevant if intervention works through a portfolio-balance channel.  
Today, by contrast, researchers define sterilized intervention as not affecting the monetary base.  
They refer to changes in asset compositions as the method of achieving sterilization, not as the 
defining characteristic of sterilized intervention.   
10
While the portfolio-balance framework was still dominant, a signaling channel had 
emerged (Mussa 1981, Genberg 1981).  Most researchers in the early 1980s interpreted signaling 
as providing information and affecting private expectation predominately—if not only—about 
future monetary policies (Rogoff 1984, p. 133. Solomon 1983, pp. 10-11).  This narrow view of 
signaling seems odd because the Desk had often referred to the “psychological” effects of 
intervention.  Presumably this meant that when traders were misinformed about fundamentals, 
defined more broadly than merely future monetary policies, intervention could guide them.   
  As Obstefeld and Rogoff (1997, p. 594) later concluded, “a large body of 
empirical research finds very little evidence of a portfolio-balance effect on foreign exchange 
risk premiums. … Global government debt levels simply change too slowly and predictably… to 
explain the size and the volatility of the exchange rate risk premium.”  The early work—prior to 
the Jurgensen Report—on the portfolio-balance effect did not directly include intervention data, 
which monetary authorities still kept confidential, but given the definition of sterilized 
intervention, this work’s conclusions were germane to any assessment of intervention’s 
effectiveness.  Hutchison’s (1984) investigation of Japanese intervention is a good example, and 
his conclusions are about as charitable to a portfolio-balance effect as anyone at the time had 
offered.  Hutchison, while not completely rejecting a portfolio-balance mechanism, concluded 
that Japanese intervention would need to be massive to affect the yen-dollar exchange rate 
through this channel.   
With the Jurgensen Report, studies began to emerge that used official confidential data to 
consider the effects of intervention on exchange rates.
11  This evidence offered mixed support for   7 
intervention.  Loopesko (1984)—the most influential paper associated with the Jurgensen 
Report—found that in most of her tests, cumulative sterilized intervention affected unexploited 
profits from a covered-interest-parity condition through either a portfolio-balance effect or a 
signaling channel.  Moreover, she found support explicitly for the portfolio-balance model in 
about one-half of currencies pairs that she considered.  She did not, however, report coefficients, 
which in previous work had often proved wrong-signed in portfolio models.  Rogoff (1984), in 
contrast, found no evidence that Canadian intervention operated through a portfolio-balance 
channel.  Humpage (1984) using time-series techniques and focusing on exchange rates—instead 
of unexploited profits—found that the heavy U.S. intervention in 1978 and 1979 had no obvious 
effect on daily exchange-rate movements.  Micossi and Rebecchini (1984), in contrast, found 
some evidence that official Italian intervention affected the lira.   
While inconclusive, the weight of the evidence did not rule out sterilized intervention, but 
it appeared to shift against a portfolio-balance channel and towards a narrowly defined signaling 
channel; that is, intervention as a signal of future monetary-policy changes.  If intervention 
operated through a signaling mechanism, however, it was not completely independent of 
monetary policy, which economists at the time understood.  To keep the signal credible, 
monetary policy would have to eventually respond in the appropriate manner.  Moreover, for 
narrowly interpreted signaling to work, monetary authorities should not undertake intervention 
secretively, as U.S. monetary authorities heretofore often did (see Genberg 1981, pp. 6-8).  The 
amount of an intervention did not seem to matter much for a signaling mechanism, while 
infrequent, coordinated operations might heighten the signal.  If, on the other hand, intervention 
might still work through a portfolio-balance mechanism, the operations should be massive and 
possibly secretive, since coordination only mattered if it increased the size of an intervention.   
Pressure, Politics, and Monetary Policy 
Academic studies, however, never had much of an impact on intervention policy.  By 
1983 and 1984, calls for U.S. intervention were widespread and growing.  In addition to many 
G7 countries, Federal Reserve officials, notably Chairman Paul Volcker and Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York President Anthony Solomon, pressed the Treasury to undertake intervention 
during the years of the dollar’s appreciation.  Volcker feared that the prolonged real dollar 
appreciation, even though it tended to lower the relative dollar-price of traded goods, might 
actually undermine the System’s anti-inflation policies.  He observed that the real dollar 
appreciation was having serious structural affects on U.S. manufactures by eroding their 
competitiveness.  He worried that if business activity began to slow, the System would come 
under heavy administration and Congressional pressures to back away from its tough monetary-
policy stance and to offset the dollar’s appreciation through lower interest rates.  He did not want 
monetary policy to pursue an exchange-rate objective at the expense of an inflation goal (see: 
Volcker and Gyohten 1992, pp. 179-80, Destler and Henning 1989, pp. 30-31).  Sterilized 
intervention could at least buy him some cover.   
As early as March 1983, Solomon wanted to approach the Treasury about automatically 
intervening when the dollar moved “quickly” (that is, disorderly), and he complained that 
intervention opportunities were routinely lost because the Treasury typically hesitated (FOMC 
Transcripts 28-29 March 1983, p. 18).  Later, out of frustration with the minimalist approach, he 
suggested that the small amounts of funds devoted to intervention stemmed from the Treasury’s 
desire to discredit the operations entirely (FOMC Transcripts 19-20 December 1983, p. 52).     8 
While Paul Volcker’s argument for intervention in 1984 did not stem from a fear that the 
U.S. current-account position was unsustainable, by that time others within the System held such 
a view (Bulletin September 1984, p. 694).  At some point, they feared, foreign investors would 
become reluctant to hold additional dollar-denominated assets in their portfolios without 
compensation for the risks of doing so.  The dollar’s appreciation prolonged and worsened the 
problem.  When the inevitable portfolio adjustment took place, the dollar could come under 
intense downward pressure.   
After the Treasury continually rebuffed Federal Reserve suggestions for a more active 
intervention policy, Volcker briefly considered, but rejected, intervening without the Treasury’s 
participation.  He feared that asserting the Federal Reserve’s independent authority for 
intervention would create political problems for the System and dissention within the FOMC, 
particularly given the lingering doubts about the efficacy of intervention (Volcker and Gyohten 
1992, pp. 180-18).  Emblematic of the difference of opinion about intervention within the FOMC 
at the time was the following exchange:  During a discussion of intervention, Governor Roberts 
asked if the Desk knew better than the market where the dollar should be.  Chairman Volcker 
responded, “At times;” Governor Wallich stated, “Yes;” but Governor Partee quipped, “I doubt 
it.” (FOMC Transcripts 28-29 March 1983, p. 18)   
  By mid-1983, the manufacturing sector was starting to pressure the administration and 
Congress for relief from the competitive effects of the strong dollar.  Between 1981 and 1985, 
their petitions for trade policy almost doubled from the late-1970s average and seemed to follow 
the business-cycle conditions and the dollar’s appreciation (Richardson, 1994, pp. 636-37).  
Manufacturers directed their ire particularly against Japan.  Increasingly, manufactures blamed 
persistent U.S. trade deficits with Japan on unfair Japanese trading practices, such as dumping, 
limiting market access, and industrial policies.  U.S. manufactures saw domestic trade 
restrictions as justified retaliation.   
When complaints about the dollar’s appreciation fell on deaf ears within the 
administration, Congress began to apply leverage by introducing a wide range of protectionist 
legislation.  In October 1984, the administration attempted to head-off complaints about the 
strong dollar and widening trade deficits by reaching an agreement with Japan to remove capital 
controls and the, so-called, administrative guidance that discouraged foreign financial flows into 
Japan.  Stronger financial flows from the United States to Japan would encourage a yen 
appreciation vis a vis the dollar and, presumably, improve the United States’ competitive 
position.  These efforts had little effect, and by 1985, prior to the Plaza Accord, Congress 
generated “a veritable explosion of trade legislation” (Destler and Henning 1989, p. 39).   
Adding to the mix of pressures on the administration and the System, some academic 
economists began to contend that the dollar’s appreciation in late 1984 and early 1985 was 
inconsistent with market fundaments and started to question the allocative efficacy of floating 
exchange rates (Frankel 1994, p. 301).  To be sure, Meese and Rogoff (1981, 1982, 1983) had 
already cast serious doubt on the profession’s ability to accurately describe equilibrium exchange 
rates.  Still, many economists maintained that exchange rates ultimately must respond to relative 
inflation differentials or current-account imbalances.  Dornbusch (1976) had demonstrated that 
exchange rates could overshoot a purchasing-power-parity equilibrium, and many economists 
understood that trading rules generated profits, suggesting that exchange markets were not 
perfectly efficient.  To these economists, the dollar was clearly overshooting its equilibrium,   9 
implying that any resulting changes in output, prices, or trading patterns were temporary, 
reversible, and a misallocation of resources.
12  They called for a policy response.
13
If the monetary authorities would not respond, Congress would.  Just prior to August 
1985, Senators Bradley, Moynihan, and Baucus submitted legislation that would require the 
Treasury and the System to intervene in the foreign-exchange market in specific amounts when 
the United States ran a large current-account deficit (Destler and Henning 1989, pp. 36-39).
   
14
Ending the Minimalist Strategy 
   
  In late 1984, the Federal Reserve began to lower its policy rates, but the System’s actions 
remained limited until early 1986.  Real rates remained relatively high throughout 1985 (see 
figures 5 and 6).  Initially foreign countries—notably Germany and Japan—were reluctant to cut 
interest rates, but they eventually followed suit.  By mid-1984, interest-rate spreads that favored 
the dollar began to narrow, suggesting a dollar depreciation.  These cautious and limited 
monetary-policy changes set an important guiding tone for the dollar over the subsequent two 
years.    
  On 17 January 1985, the G5 met in Washington.  Treasury Secretary Regan announced 
that the G5 countries had reaffirmed their commitment to macroeconomic convergence, but the 
G5’s recent discussions focused more on exchange markets than in the past, and they 
“reaffirmed” their 1983 Williamsburg Summit commitment to concerted intervention and agreed 
to sell dollars.  The heavier emphasis on intervention evolved because the large industrial 
countries resented tightening their domestic monetary policies as a counterweight to the dollar’s 
strength.  (They seem to have already forgotten the conclusions reached in the Jurgensen 
Report.)  Their recent economic recovery had been sluggish.  Any intervention would be 
undertaken when all parties to an operation agreed, and it would be concerted with each central 
bank acting in its own market.
15
The objective of the intervention was a lower dollar, but—as Chairman Volcker 
indicated—the United States was not undertaking “drive-the-dollar-down operations.” (FOMC 
Transcripts 18 January 1985, p. 5)  Consistent with Volcker’s characterization, U.S. operations 
remained fairly limited.  Between 22 January 1985 and 1 March 1985, the United States only 
bought German marks on eight days (see table 1).  The transactions ranged from $46 million 
equivalent in January to $100 million by the end of February.  The System also bought $48 
million equivalent Japanese yen on 1 February 1985.  The Bundesbank and other monetary 
authorities also intervened.  Germany intervened more frequently than the United States (28 
days), and typically on a much larger scale.   
   
During this period, the United States intervened primarily in German marks because of its 
importance within the European Monetary System.  By buying and selling German marks, the 
United States could, potentially, affect the relationship of the dollar vis-à-vis all European 
currencies.  In addition, the United States intervened in Japanese yen because that currency was 
quickly acquiring international status (see FOMC Transcripts 18 January 1985, p. 4).  Typically 
in G5 communiqués the United States mentioned a willingness to intervene in G5 currencies, and 
the United States continued to maintain the system of swap lines that it established in the 1960s 
to finance interventions, but after 1980 the United States never intervened in any other currency 
besides the mark and yen—with one exception.     10 
The United States undertook an unusual intervention in British pounds in February 1985 
for political reasons.  At the time, sterling was under strong downward pressure, and Prime 
Minister Thatcher was scheduled to visit the United States.  The United States bought $16.4 
million worth of British pounds, split between the System’s and the U.S. Treasury’s accounts, 
sometime in February.
16
Economically, this transaction was inconsequential, but it highlighted an important 
problem that intervention always posed for central-bank independence when the political 
authorities had some control over the operations.  Consistent with fears expressed by the FOMC 
in the early 1960s, by undertaking this intervention, the System seemed to act as a foreign-policy 
appendage of the State Department and outside of the appropriations process (see chapter 3).   
  When Governor Rice questioned the political nature of this 
intervention, Sam Cross responded (FOMC Transcripts 26 March 1985, p. 3): “Well, I think it 
had some implication of being done in light of those political circumstances, yes.”    
The dollar peaked in late February 1985 and, thereafter, generally depreciated throughout 
the next three years.  In late August and early September 1985, however, it seemed like the 
depreciation had stalled.  At this time, the dollar began to appreciate as market participants 
temporarily lowered their expectations for further interest-rate cuts in the United States.  
Economic activity seemed robust, money growth was strong, and foreign investors were not 
rebalancing their portfolios away from U.S. securities as some had feared (Bulletin February 
1986, 109-110).   
An Analysis of Pre-Plaza Interventions 
The Regan-Sprinkel minimalist approach did not entirely preclude foreign-exchange 
intervention (see figures 1 and 2 and table 1).  Under this regime, the United States intervened 
“only when necessary to counter conditions of clear and manifest disorder in exchange markets.” 
(Desk Report, March 1982, p. 2)  “Clear” and “manifest” seemed to be the new operative words.  
Between 20 April 1981 and 29 March 1985, a period consisting of 1030 business days, the 
United States intervened on 25 occasions against German marks.  On 8 of these occasions, the 
Desk also bought Japanese yen.  The Desk bought only yen on 3 days.  As can be seen it table 1, 
the frequency of these transactions grew as the dollar continued to appreciate relative to the 
German mark.  Most transactions were split equally between the Treasury’s and the System’s 
accounts.   
Although the number of interventions during this pre-Plaza period is too small to draw 
strong conclusions, our analysis, which we explained in the empirical appendix, suggests that 
although U.S. purchases of marks and yen did not foster dollar depreciations, they did seem to 
moderate the pace of the dollar’s appreciation.  Only 6 of the 24 U.S. purchases of German 
marks were associated with a same-day dollar depreciation against the German mark, and only 4 
of the 11 U.S. purchases of Japanese yen were associated with a same-day dollar depreciation 
against the Japanese yen (see table 2).  In both cases, the observed number of successes is 
smaller, but not statistically different, than the number that we would randomly anticipate given 
the variable pattern of day-to-day exchange-rate movements.  The evidence of success is 
somewhat more favorable when judged on a leaning-against-the-wind criterion.  During 7 of the 
24 days on which the United States bought German marks, the pace of the dollar’s appreciation 
slowed relative to the previous day.  This number is two standard deviations greater than the 
expected number of successes.  Similarly, during 5 of the 11 days on which the United States 
purchased Japanese yen, the pace of the dollar’s appreciation slowed relative to the previous day.    11 
This number was also greater than two standard deviations above the expected number of 
successes.   
Bagshaw and Humpage (1986), using an entirely different statistical technique, found 
that intervention during the minimalist period had little effect.  They compared exchange-rate 
volatility during a sub-sample of the minimalist-intervention period—1 April 1981 to 31 March 
1982—with a period of heavy intervention—1 March 1980 to 28 February 1981.  They found 
virtually no evidence of a change in volatility over the two periods, except some tendency for 
relatively large exchange rate changes to be more common during the minimalist period.
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3.  From the Plaza to the Louvre: 1985 – 1987 
  In 
addition, they found that exchange rates generally were no more volatile than other asset prices 
over the two periods.   
On 3 February 1985, James Baker replaced Donald Regan as U.S. Secretary of the 
Treasury.  Over the next three years, he pursued macroeconomic-policy coordination to resolve 
perceived global imbalances much more vigorously than his predecessor had.  Like many in the 
United States, Baker believed that Germany and Japan relied too heavily on their export sectors 
and, by extension, U.S. economic growth to drive their economies.  Both countries maintained 
sizable and persistent trade surpluses with the United States.  Baker wanted Germany and Japan 
to spur economic growth internally through the adoption of expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies.  Both countries had experienced relatively sluggish economic growth since the last 
recession and, hence, had ample room to expand.  Not only would faster growth in Germany and 
Japan help alleviate global current-account imbalances, but it would reinforce the world 
economic expansion at a time when the U.S. economy showed signs of slowing (Volcker and 
Gyohten 1995).
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Baker was also free to toss foreign-exchange-market intervention into the policy-
coordination mix, since—unlike his predecessor—he had never objected to such operations.  The 
Plaza interventions in late 1985 sought to lower the dollar and to avoid protectionist threats 
emanating from the U.S. Congress.  By 1987, with the dollar now depreciated, the Louvre 
interventions attempted to stabilize the dollar-yen and dollar-mark exchange rates.  The 
administration then used the threat of backing away from the Louvre agreement and letting the 
dollar depreciate anew to gain leverage over Germany and Japan for macroeconomic-policy 
coordination.   
    
The Plaza Accord   
  The dollar began to depreciate in late February 1985, shortly after Baker took office, but 
well before the September Plaza accord.  The Federal Reserve had tentatively started to ease 
monetary policy in late 1984 and continued to do so through 1986 (see figures 3 and 4).  By 
August, the dollar had depreciated 9 percent on a trade-weighted basis against the currencies of 
the major developed countries, but late in that month the dollar’s depreciation began to reverse as 
interest-rate spreads moved temporarily in favor of dollar assets.  Money growth had exceeded 
its target, and many Fed watchers thought that the FOMC would act to rein it back into its target 
range.  By mid September, the dollar had appreciated 8 percent against the German mark and 3 
percent against the Japanese yen.  Although the dollar subsequently began to depreciate, even 
prior to the G5 meeting in New York, this “pause” lent support to those who thought the dollar 
had lost touch with fundamentals and who favored coordinated intervention.
19      12 
  The 22 September 1985 (or Plaza) communiqué of the G5 noted that although some 
progress towards macroeconomic convergence had been made, exchange rates had not responded 
fully.  The Plaza accord said that “exchange rates should better reflect fundamental economic 
conditions than has been the case,” and that “some further orderly appreciation of the main non-
dollar currencies is desirable,” and that the G5 “stand ready to cooperate more closely to 
encourage this when to do so would be helpful.”
20
  Funabashi (1988, pp. 17-8) and Frankel (1994, p. 304) contend that the G5 agreed to 
specifics about intervention as spelled out in a “nonpaper,” which was never released.  The paper 
targeted a 10 to 12 percent depreciation of the dollar over the near term.
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Following the Plaza meeting, the dollar fell sharply, even before any intervention had 
taken place.  On Monday morning, 23 September 1985, the dollar had fallen 5 percent against 
the German mark and 2.6 percent against the Japanese yen since the previous Friday.  The 
Bundesbank began intervening on Monday in the European markets, selling $8 million.  Later in 
the day, when the New York market opened, the United States began buying German marks and 
Japanese yen.  With Japanese markets closed on that Monday, the Bank of Japan did not begin 
intervening until Tuesday, 24 September 1985.  Over these first three days, the United States and 
the other G5 central banks collectively intervened in “massive” amounts (Bulletin February 
1986, p.110).   
  This would place the 
dollar in a range of roughly 214 to 218 against the yen and 2.54 to 2.59 against the mark.  Once 
key exchange rates reached these levels, countries would be relieved of their obligation to 
intervene, but the agreement, of course, did not preclude further collective or individual 
interventions.     
The dollar depreciated sharply against both the mark and the yen until 4 October 1985, as 
the United States sold $199 million against German marks and $262 million against Japanese 
yen.  As the dollar began to firm somewhat after 4 October, the United States intensified its 
intervention efforts selling nearly $1.6 billion against marks and nearly $618 million against 
Japanese yen during the middle two weeks of October.  Central banks in other large developed 
countries continued to intervene (Bulletin February 1986, p. 110 - 111).  After this, intervention 
efforts rapidly tapered off and by 8 November the Plaza efforts ended.  Overall, the United States 
sold nearly $1.9 billion against German marks and just over $1.4 billion against Japanese yen.  
The U.S. Treasury’s and the System’s accounts shared equally in the operations. The 
interventions were closely coordinated with the Bank of Japan and the European G5 countries 
(Bulletin February 1986, p. 111).   Germany sold $1.2 billion.   All of the operations were highly 
visible to the market, suggesting that the operations sought to influence expectations.    
  During this period, the Desk sometimes intervened in the Far East, which it had not done 
in quite a while, but the Desk did not buy Japanese yen.
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  Although the operations were intended to encourage the dollar depreciation that was 
already under way, the Desk did not lean with the wind in a traditional sense.  That is, the Desk 
did not buy foreign exchange when the dollar was depreciating.  Instead, the Desk only bought 
foreign exchange when the dollar was rising as a way of resisting appreciations.  According to 
Cross (FOMC Transcripts 1 October 1985, p. 2), “U.S. authorities did not want to push the 
  When the Japanese were operating in 
their own market against dollars, the United States transacted in the Far East in German marks to 
show evidence of a coordinated approach.  These operations also were typically visible to the 
market (FOMC Transcripts 4-5 November 1985, p. 1).     13 
dollar down in a way that could start an uncontrolled fall.”  Volcker’s concern about the dollar 
had shifted; he now worried about a hard-landing scenario—a dollar free-fall, as he called it—
that would put upward pressure on interest rates and prices in the United States and, thereby, 
complicate monetary policy.   
The hard-landing scenario envisioned international investors shifting quickly out of 
dollar-denominated assets to avoid capital losses associated with a dollar depreciation.  The U.S. 
net international investment position was shrinking because of persistent U.S. current-account 
deficits, and it would become negative by 1986, implying that the rest of the world held net 
claims against the United States.  If U.S. current-account deficits continued, at some point, 
international investors would become increasingly reluctant to add additional dollar-denominated 
assets to their portfolios without compensation for the growing risks of doing so.  Then, as their 
reluctance grew, the dollar would depreciate in the spot market relative to its forward rates and 
U.S. real interest rates would rise relative to rates abroad.  These adjustments would proceed 
until they raised the foreign-currency return on dollar-denominated assets and provided investors 
with ample compensation for the perceived risk of holding them.   
At question was the speed with which such a development might play out.  A smooth 
adjustment would have few adverse economic consequences for the United States, but a very 
rapid adjustment could be cataclysmic, and any attempt to push the dollar down, Volcker feared, 
might trigger a rush out of dollar-denominated assets.  The concern that Volcker voiced helps 
explain why U.S. intervention operations, even during this cooperative period, remained fairly 
limited (see Volcker and Gyohten 1992, pp.244-247).    
The primary effect of the Plaza accord was to induce an immediate, short-lived 
depreciation of the dollar against both the German mark and the Japanese yen, through a narrow 
expectations channel (see figures 7 and 8).  According to the System’s review of the episode 
(Bulletin February 1986, p.110), market participants interpreted the accord’s announcement, 
which was unanticipated and the product of a U.S. initiative, as signaling a change in the 
administration’s regard for a strong dollar.  For one thing, the minimalist approach seemed to 
have ended.  Under its minimalist strategy, the administration intervened only to “counter 
conditions of clear and manifest disorder.”  Now, the administration was actively trying to push 
the dollar down and to bring exchange rates back in line with perceived fundamentals.  Most 
important for exchange rates, however, the Plaza accord reduced the chances that the System 
would tighten reserve conditions even though aggregates exceed their target range.  Many market 
participants expected U.S. monetary authorities to lower interest rates, possibly in conjunction 
with interest-rate cuts among the other G5 countries, but in a manner that reduced the incentive 
for investing in dollar-denominated assets and that, thereby, fostered a dollar depreciation 
(Bulletin May 1986, p. 299).  During the Plaza episode, both nominal and real Japanese short-
term interest rates rose sharply, while nominal and real German short-term rates also drifted up.  
Consequently, nominal and real interest-rate spreads tended to move in a direction that fostered a 
dollar depreciation (see figures 5 and 6).   
The dollar’s one-time depreciation against both the German mark and Japanese yen, by 
and large, seems associated largely with the Plaza announcement and not with the subsequent 
intervention.
23  The dollar opened lower in New York against both the mark and yen on that 
Monday compared with Friday, even before the United States intervened.  (Of course, this 
depreciation—at least against the German mark—could have been a response to the German 
intervention, which was already underway.)  Humpage (1988), using simple regression   14 
techniques, found no relationship between intervention and subsequent day-to-day exchange rate 
movements during the Plaza period.  Feldstein (1986), using exchange-rate data at both a 
monthly and a weekly frequency, concluded that Plaza interventions essentially produced a one-
time downward shift in key exchange-rates, but did not otherwise alter their trend movements.
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The effects of the Plaza agreement began to wear off by early October because policy 
makers in the G5 countries were no longer reinforcing or substantiating expectations of 
additional policy initiatives to drive the dollar lower.  The dollar actually appreciated 3 percent 
against the mark between 4 October and 16 October 1985.  The market, which anticipated 
additional policy initiatives on the part of the G5 countries, began to lose confidence when the 
recent IMF and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development meetings focused on the 
international-debt situation rather than on macroeconomic convergence.  Moreover, Bundesbank 
President Pöhl quickly expressed satisfaction with the extent of the dollar depreciation.   
  
Whereas intervention, itself, seems to have had no clearly discernable, persistent effects on 
exchange rates, monetary policies between the United States and German and, especially, 
between the United States and Japan changed in manners consistent with dollar depreciations.  
Subsequent policy validated the expectations that the Plaza accord created, at least for awhile.   
According to Destler and Henning (1989, p. 50), Pöhl announced that the dollar had 
reached an acceptable level in a little more than two weeks after the Plaza declaration, when the 
dollar had depreciated only about 7 percent against the German mark.  Funabashi (1988, pp. 30-
1) notes that the United States criticized Germany for not intervening more following the Plaza 
agreement.  He maintains that in part the Europeans saw the dollar chiefly overvalued against the 
yen.  In addition, Funabashi notes that the EMS constrained German actions.  If the Germans had 
undertaken much larger dollar sales, the mark risked appreciating within the EMS, since the 
Bundesbank could not quickly sterilize the intervention.  In the Germany’s view, other European 
countries needed to sell more dollars in order to maintain the EMS (Funabashi 1988, pp. 30-1).   
This criticism of Pöhl’s announcement may be justified, but, nevertheless, the 
Bundesbank sold nearly as many dollars as the United States.  Between 23 September 1985 and 
8 November 1985, the Bundesbank sold approximately $1.2 billion, while the United States 
bought nearly $1.9 billion equivalent German marks.  Moreover, by early November, Federal 
Reserve officials, like their German counterparts, were busy denying the existence of any 
agreement to encourage a dollar depreciation by manipulating international interest-rate spreads 
(Cross, Winter 1985-86, p. 47)   
  While the intervention may have had a signaling effect—causing market participants to 
anticipate further reductions in interest rates—Volcker suggests that within the System, the 
dollar’s depreciation dampened the FOMC’s ardor for monetary ease.  To be sure, monetary 
policy in the United States eased as growth slowed and inflation moderated.  Many Federal 
Reserve Banks, however, were requesting a discount-rate reduction, which forecasted their 
intended policy stance at the next FOMC meeting.  “But with the dollar already declining so 
sharply, the balance of the argument to me [Volcker] and most of my colleagues was the other 
way.  Without clearer evidence that the expansion had petered out, easing money in the face of a 
rapid decline in the dollar seemed too much like pouring Federal Reserve oil on a fire already 
burning that I wanted to keep under control.” (Volcker and Gyothen 1992, p. 247) 
Over all during the Plaza episode (20 September to 8 November 1985) the dollar 
depreciated nearly 8 percent against the German mark and 14 percent against the Japanese yen.    15 
The dollar stood at 2.62 marks per dollar on 8 November 1985, not quite in the 2.54 to 2.56 
range that Funabashi suggested was an implicit target.  The dollar did, however, slide beyond the 
214-218 yen per dollar implicit target that Funabashi mentioned to 205.6 on 8 November 1985.   
The slight variation between the Japanese yen and Germany mark might have resulted 
because the Japanese monetary authorities were not as quick as their West German counterparts 
to disavow their currency’s appreciation.  The dollar continued to depreciate against the Japanese 
yen through early November 1985.  Officials at the Bank of Japan and at the Japanese Finance 
Ministry had announced on October 15 additional policy changes to encourage a yen 
appreciation.  Yen interest rates rose, especially short-term interest rates.   
Between Plaza and Louvre 
Throughout 1986, the dollar depreciated on balance in an orderly manner against all 
major currencies, particularly the Japanese yen.  The overall dollar depreciation seemed 
consistent with the continuing worldwide trade imbalances and with general trends in interest-
rate differentials.  With the dollar now depreciating in an orderly fashion, consistent with the 
perceived fundamentals, the United States saw no need to intervene.  Between mid-November 
1985 and the Louvre accord in February 1987, the United States intervened on only two occasion 
in very small amounts.
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Other key central banks, however, bought substantial amounts of dollars throughout 1986 
and January1987.  As early as March 1986, the Japanese started to view the Plaza accord as a 
mistake, because they believed that it kicked off a persistent yen appreciation, which continued 
through 1988.  Japanese exporters, particularly small to medium-sized firms, complained 
(Volcker and Gyothen, 1992, p. 256).  
   
U.S. Treasury Secretary Baker, who had been trying to get Germany and Japan to 
stimulate their economies, wanted the G5 to undertake coordinated interest-rate cuts in part to 
offset the global effects of a projected slowing in U.S. real economic growth, in part to help 
developing countries with their debt problems, and in part to alleviate global current-account 
imbalances.  The G7 ministers and central-bank governors began meeting regularly to promote 
policy coordination, specifically a convergence among their monetary policies.  Baker threatened 
that if the G7 did not participate, unilaterally lower U.S. interest rates would cause further dollar 
depreciation.  Volcker, who continued to worry about a hard-landing scenario for the dollar, was 
not in favor of unilateral interest-rate cuts, particularly when dictated by the U.S. Treasury.  The 
Reagan appointees on the Board of Governors, however, advocated monetary ease.   
Volcker had already discussed the need for coordinated interest-rate cuts with the Bank 
of Japan and with the Bundesbank, but to no avail.  On 24 February 1986, the Federal Reserve 
Board voted 4 to 3 to cut the discount rate over Volcker’s objection.  After Volcker threatened 
Vice-Chairman Preston Martin and Governor Wayne Angell with his resignation, the Board 
agreed to wait.  Volcker and Pöhl subsequently agreed to undertake coordinated rate cuts in 
March after the Bundesbank’s next policy meeting.  On 6 and 7 March 1986, Germany, France, 
Japan, and the United States undertook coordinated interest-rate cuts.  Vice-Chairman Preston 
Martin resigned on 31 March 1986 (see figure 9).  On 21 April 1986, the Board undertook 
another rate cut that was coordinated with the Bank of Japan.
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  The Federal Reserve undertook two unilateral discount rate cuts on 11 July 1986 and 21 
August 1986 and may have been trying to encourage Germany and Japan to take further steps to 
     16 
stimulate their economies.  According to Funabashi (1988, p. 53), when Volcker pressed, “Pöhl 
responded that he and his colleagues would consider a rate cut, but only with the stipulation that 
Baker announce publicly after the next G5 meeting that the United States was prepared to 
stabilize the dollar.  Volcker promised to discuss the proposal with Baker.”  Baker, however, 
rejected the idea.   
  With Germany and Japan now concerned about further dollar depreciation, Baker 
continued with his strategy of trying to persuade countries to adopt expansionary policies under 
the threat of a dollar depreciation.   At the Tokyo Summit in May 1986, the G7 avoid discussion 
of exchange rates, but agreed with a U.S. proposal for adopting a wide array of economic 
indicators and quantitative objectives by which to judge countries’ economic performances.  
  In September 1986, Baker met secretly with Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa 
in San Francisco.  The U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit-
reduction act, and the Japanese agreed to an expansionary supplemental fiscal package.  Both 
countries claimed that the dollar was consistent with fundamentals—after allowances for these 
fiscal proposals—and agreed to stabilize the dollar.  By the time that the deal was announced in 
October 1986, however, the yen had depreciated sharply, albeit temporarily, and U.S. officials 
suspected that the Japanese had deliberately engineered the depreciation to take advantage of the 
agreement (see Frankel 1994, p. 306).   
Louvre Period: 1987   
By early 1987, the dollar had reversed nearly all of the real and nominal appreciation that 
it experienced between 1981 and 1985, but global trade imbalances had not yet shown any 
improvement and remained a contentious political issue.  The U.S. current-account deficit 
remained around 3½ percent of GDP; the net international investment position had now become 
negative, and both Germany and Japan continued to post substantial current-account surpluses.  
Private foreign investors seemed increasingly reluctant to acquire dollar-denominated assets 
(Loopesko and Johnson 1987).  The dollar continued to depreciate, but at a more modest pace, 
and interest-rate spreads widened to attract private financial flows.  Germany and Japan became 
even more reluctant to stimulate their economies since both were concerned about money growth 
and inflationary pressures.  At the same time, neither wanted to encourage a further dollar 
depreciation.  Many believed that a pause in exchange-rate realignments was needed to allow the 
recent adjustments to feed through and to prevent an overshoot on the downside (Dobson 1991, 
p. 61).   
In January 1987, the dollar came under heavy selling pressure that contributed to a 
realignment of central rates within the European Monetary System.  Despite the problems in the 
EMS, much of the dollar’s movement in January occurred relative to the Japanese yen, and it 
prompted heavy Japanese intervention (Bulletin May 1987 p. 333).  On 28 January, the United 
States intervened in a “hectic and nervous” market, selling a small amount ($50 million 
equivalent) of yen (Cross Spring 1987a).  The intervention followed statements reaffirming 
cooperation among the major central banks.  A 1.2 percent appreciation of the dollar relative to 
the yen followed, and the yen-dollar rate remained relatively stable through mid-March.   
The dollar seemed to stabilize in February, following the release of more favorable trade 
data in late January 1987.  At the 22 February 1987, Louvre meeting of the G6—the G5 plus 
Canada (Italy abstained)—the United States pledged to stabilize the dollar in return for a 
Japanese and German commitment to additional economic stimulus.  Japan agreed to cut its   17 
discount rate and to submit a supplemental budget to stimulate domestic demand, and Germany 
agreed to increase planned 1988 tax cuts.  For its part, the United States also reiterated its 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets for deficit reduction (Destler and Henning 1989, p. 60).   
With respect to exchange rates, the Louvre communiqué (paragraph 10) stated that 
“…the substantial exchange rate changes since the Plaza Agreement will increasingly contribute 
to reducing external imbalances and have now brought their [the G6 countries’] currencies 
within ranges broadly consistent with underlying economic fundamentals… Further substantial 
exchange rate shifts among their currencies could damage growth and adjustment prospects in 
their countries.  In current circumstances, therefore, they agreed to cooperate closely to foster 
stability of exchange rates around current levels.”
27
Funabashi (1988, pp. 185-187) claims that the G6 agreed to secret targets for the mark-
dollar and yen-dollar exchange rates at their Louvre meeting.
   
28  His narrative, however, is not 
clear about how seriously the delegates actually took any targets.  They were not widely favored, 
and any obligation seemed vague and open to interpretation.
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“In the final hour of the Louvre dinner, de Larosiére and Darman worked together 
to give final shape to a joint proposal.  Two specified midpoint rates were agreed: 
1.8250 deutsche marks to the dollar and 153.50 yen to the dollar; plus or minus 
2.5 percent was determined as a first line of defense for mutual intervention on a 
voluntary basis, while at 5 percent consultation on policy adjustment was to be 
obligatory; between these limits of 2.5 percent to 5 percent, intervention efforts 
were expected to intensify.  All the agreements were to be kept strictly 
confidential and were provisional until the Washington G-5 meeting in April.”   
  Indeed, Treasury Secretary Baker 
said on 23 March 1987 that the G6 did not set target zones for dollar exchange rates.  We can 
find no statement of the targets in published Federal Reserve documents, but Volcker and 
Gyohten (1992) contend that target ranges had been discussed within the U.S. Treasury for some 
time prior to the Louvre.  According to Funabashi (1988, p. 186):   
The French seemed to favor target zones, and the U.S. Treasury was receptive to the idea, but the 
Germans and the British did not want target ranges (Funabashi, 1988, pp. 183-186).   
The 2.5 percent range for the yen was 149.75 to 157.33 and the 5 percent range was 
146.19 to 161.7.  The 2.5 percent range for the German mark was 1.7804 to 1.8706, and the 5 
percent range for the German mark was 1.73809 to 1.9262.  The targets suggested that 
mandatory intervention against the Japanese yen would take place when the dollar depreciated 
below 146.19 or appreciated above 161.17, but official sales of yen might start as early as 
149.75, and official purchases of yen might start at a rate of 157.33.  The Japanese, however, did 
not want the yen-dollar rate to fall below 150.  Similarly, mandatory intervention against German 
marks would take place when the dollar depreciated below 1.7389 or appreciated beyond 1.9262, 
but official sales of marks might start as early as 1.7804, and official purchases of marks might 
start at 1.8706.   
The United States, Germany, Japan, and other key central banks did not immediately 
intervene following the Louvre communiqué.  On 11 March 1987, as the dollar rose above 
1.8600 marks, the United States bought $30 million equivalent German marks, but would not 
intervene again against marks until late April (see figure 10).  The dollar continued to appreciate 
on 11 March, suggesting that the intervention had not been successful, but the dollar began a 
sustained depreciation on the next day.  Less than two weeks later, however, the United States   18 
began to intervene frequently and very heavily in Japanese yen as heightened trade tensions with 
Japan sent the dollar below 150 yen (see figure 11).  The Desk sold roughly $3.0 billion worth of 
Japanese yen on 11 consecutive days between 23 March and 6 April 1987, often in concert with 
the Bank of Japan (Bulletin July 1987, pp. 552-553).  The FOMC Subcommittee on Foreign 
Exchange allowed the Desk to exceed daily intervention limits on yen (Desk Report 1988, p. 7).  
On April 6, according the Funabashi (1988, p. 6), the G6 rebased the yen.  They set a new central 
rate of 146, a 2.5 percent range of 142.43 to 149.65 and a 5 percent range of 139.04 to 153.30.  
Then, through the end of April 1987, the Desk sold an additional $1.0 billion worth of yen, often 
in concert with the Bank of Japan and several European banks (Bulletin July 1987, p. 555).   The 
Bundesbank, however, did not participate in these interventions.  The operations had little 
obvious effect on exchange rates (see figures 10 and 11).      
Baker was upset with the Germans for not acting in concert.  The Bundesbank did not 
intervene until late in April because it “feared that massive interventions to prop up the dollar 
would swell West Germany’s currency reserves and create excessive liquidity.” (Funabashi, 
1988, p. 191).  In 1979, the Bundesbank—like the Federal Reserve—began to pursue a goal of 
price stability, and it adopted monetary targets to improve the credibility of its commitment.  The 
Bundesbank overshot its monetary targets in 1986, and it would do so again in 1987 and 1988 in 
part because of attempts to resist an appreciation of the mark (Hetzel 2002,  pp. 50-51; Kole and 
Meade 1995,  pp. 917-931).  Because of these persistent monetary overshoots, the Bundesbank 
was unenthusiastic about any policy coordination or intervention that ascribed to Germany an 
expansionary obligation.   
Neumann and von Hagen (1991) show that the German Bundesbank has often permitted 
deviations between actual money growth and targeted money growth because of exchange rate 
considerations.  Von Hagen (1989) also argues that when the market is strong against both the 
dollar and the ERM currencies, the Bundesbank did not permanently sterilize its interventions.
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The situation was similar for Japan.  Hutchison (1988) indicates that the Bank of Japan 
factored an exchange-rate objective into its monetary-policy decisions between 1978 and 1985, 
and Takagi (1989) claimed that after late 1985, the Bank of Japan allowed intervention to affect 
its monetary base. 
  
In late April and early May 1987, U.S. interest rates continued to firm, and “market 
participants became impressed by the Federal Reserve’s willingness to adjust monetary policy to 
support the dollar, as well as by the complementary policy adjustments taken in other countries.  
Market observers particularly noted comments made in late April by Chairman Volcker that the 
Federal Reserve had adjusted monetary policy—‘snugged up’ interest rates—to counter 
exchange-market pressures as well as comments by Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone that the 
Bank of Japan would ease short-term interest rates.” (Desk Report 1988, p. 9-10)  The German 
Bundesbank also seemed to cooperate in the efforts to stabilize the exchange rate by reducing the 
rates at which it provided liquidity to its banking system.  Interest-rate differentials vis-à-vis 
German mark and Japanese yen denominated assets stood at their widest point since the dollar’s 
peak and began to attract funds into dollars (Desk Report 1988, p. 10).  An improvement in U.S. 
net exports and tensions in the Middle East also buoyed the dollar.  As the dollar rose above 1.89 
marks, the Desk began to buy German marks.   
By May 1987, however, the FOMC began to question the appropriateness of heavy 
intervention (FOMC Transcripts 19 May 1987, pp. 3-5).   At least, the intervention was   19 
consistent with the thrust of U.S. monetary policy.  Intervention continued very intermittently 
throughout May and June, with the United States selling a relatively small, $123 million 
equivalent yen and relatively moderate $680 million equivalent German marks, often in concert 
with other central banks (Bulletin October 1987, pp. 780-781).   
The dollar continued to firm until early August.  Then, the dollar rose above 1.85 marks, 
prompting the United States to intervene again against marks.  Between 4 and 10 August 1987, 
the Desk bought $631 million worth of marks to resist the appreciation of the dollar against the 
mark.  The Bundesbank sold $227 million and other G6 monetary authorities participated 
(Bulletin January 1988, pp. 14 – 15).  These interventions had no net effect; on 10 August 1987 
the exchange rate was 1.8953 marks per dollar compared with 1.8817 on 4 August 1987.   
By 11 August, following the release of poor trade numbers, the dollar turned about and 
began to depreciate, especially against the Japanese yen.  Between 24 August 1987 and 2 
September 1987, the Desk sold $390 million equivalent yen in concert with the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance (Bulletin January 1988, pp. 14 – 15).  Between 28 August 1987 and 18 
September 1987, the Bundesbank bought $414 million; other central banks intervened to support 
the dollar (Bulletin January 1988, p. 15).  On 2 September 1987, the Desk sold $50 million 
against German marks.  Despite the interventions, the dollar continued to depreciate.  On 4 
September the Federal Reserve increased the discount rate to deal with mounting inflationary 
pressures.  Interest rates in the United States subsequently began to rise.   
  Although U.S. monetary authorities sometimes bought foreign exchange, the Louvre 
operations consisted mostly of purchases of foreign exchange in an attempt to support the dollar.   
The Federal Reserve System financed most of the German mark operations during the Louvre 
period, while the Treasury financed most of the Japanese yen intervention.  The operations failed 
to keep the targeted dollar exchange rates within the envisioned ranges.   
The perception of international cooperation started to erode in mid-October 1987.  
Market participants believed that the Bank of Japan and, particularly, the Bundesbank might 
raise policy rates and adopt less accommodative monetary policies.  Money growth in both 
countries exceeded targets and contributed to concerns over mounting inflation.  Interest rates 
rose in Germany and Japan, although interest-rate differentials continued to support dollar assets 
(Desk Report 1988, p. 14).     
In September and early October 1987, Secretary of the Treasury Baker publicly criticized 
foreign interest rate increases as not being in compliance with the Louvre accord.  He reportedly 
threatened Germany with a still weaker dollar, although the administration later denied the 
reports (NYT 16 October 1987, pp. A1).  He also suggested that U.S. interest rates would not 
follow German interest rates higher.   
On 19 October 1987, the stock-market crashed and the Federal Reserve provided 
sufficient liquidity to the market to lower interest rates.  The dollar depreciated sharply against 
both the German mark and Japanese yen.  Baker then met with German Finance Minister 
Stoltenberg to set aside recent criticisms and to re-affirm their Louvre commitments.  They 
agreed to renewed cooperation on monetary policies and on stabilizing dollar exchange rates.  
German interest rates subsequently moved substantially lower.  By 27 October 1987, the United 
States began selling German marks and Japanese yen to stem the dollar’s depreciation.  Between 
27 October 1987 and 11 November 1987, the Desk sold $1.1 billion equivalent German marks 
and $443 million equivalent Japanese yen.  Over roughly the same days, the Bundesbank bought   20 
$1.4 billion.  The Bank of Japan and other central banks also bought dollars in concert with U.S. 
authorities (Bulletin January 1988, p. 17).  The Bundesbank subsequently cut its key policy rates.   
Following the stock-market crash, as concerns about a possible recession grew, public 
support for exchange-rate stabilization efforts began to wane.  “Widespread press commentary 
questioned the priority for the United States of stabilizing exchange rates in view of concerns 
about the possible impact of the stock market decline on U.S. economic activity.”  (Desk Report 
1988, p. 16)  Likewise, “…on December 22 [1987] when the Group of Seven nations issued a 
statement reaffirming economic policy coordination and stating that a further decline of the 
dollar could be counterproductive, market participants remained unconvinced that decisive 
action would be taken to halt the dollar’s decline.” (Desk Report 1988, p. 18)  The market 
understood that intervening to support the dollar was inconsistent with the need for monetary 
ease in the United States.   
The dollar continued to depreciate and the Desk continued operations to support the 
dollar.  Between 27 November 1987 and 21 January 1988, the Desk sold $1.7 billion worth of 
marks and $1.4 billion equivalent yen often in concert with other central banks (Bulletin April 
1988 pp. 209 – 211).  The Bundesbank, for example, bought $1.7 billion.  As Volcker (Volcker 
and Gyohten 1992, p.269) recalled: 
“The [December 1987 G7 communiqué] marked the end of a somewhat 
confused three-year process, the results of which were not very 
satisfactory, at least at the time, because all our efforts in aligning 
exchange rates and coordinating macroeconomic policy had failed to 
produce tangible, clear results.  The external imbalance among major 
countries—especially the Japanese trade surplus and the American deficit, 
the two-sided political irritant that has started the whole exercise—did not 
improve despite the major changes in exchange rate relationships.”  
Why Policy Coordination Fails 
  By the late 1980s, many economists seemed to share Volcker’s observations about the 
recent failure at macroeconomic policy coordination.  Myriad empirical papers appeared and 
concluded that the gains from the types of policies that Treasury Secretaries Baker and Brady 
had been pursuing within the G5 and G7 were small and asymmetrically distributed, with the 
United States often benefiting least (see: Humpage 1990, Hamada and Kawai 1997, McKibbin 
1997).  These studies showed that the theoretical gleam of ongoing macroeconomic policy 
coordination tarnished quickly when exposed to empirical verification.   
  In a world where markets are closely integrated, the policy actions of any one nation, 
particularly those of a large developed country, are certain to affect the wellbeing of other 
nations.  Sometimes these policy spillovers are positive, sometimes they are negative.  The 
existence of such policy interdependencies offers a theoretical justification for macroeconomic 
policy coordination.   
  Countries understand these external policy effects, but they evaluate them lopsidedly.  
They consider the implications of foreign policy action on their own economic well-being, and 
they set their own policy instruments after taking foreign policies into account, but sovereign 
nations do not fully consider the implications of their own policies for the economic welfare of 
other countries.  When all countries act this way, they achieve a Nash equilibrium, but better 
outcomes are conceivably possible.    21 
  Many theoretical models suggest that when countries ignore the consequences of their 
actions for world welfare, their policies often prove to be suboptimal in the sense that some 
alternative set of policies, which account for all of the spillover effects, could make at least one 
country better off without making any other country worse off.  Implicitly, these models assume 
that individual countries do not have enough independent policy instruments to maintain all of 
their desired policy goals or that the interdependences alter the relationship between countries’ 
domestic policy instruments and their ultimate objectives.  In these cases, macroeconomic policy 
coordination can achieve a welfare improving set of policies.   
In most theoretical applications, however, this welfare improving outcome is fragile.  
Countries often have strong incentives to renege on the coordinated policy once they believe that 
other countries have adopted it.  Consequently, the world tends to gravitate back to the Nash 
equilibrium.  Absent some sort of strict enforcement mechanism, macroeconomic policy 
coordination may not be sustainable, even in theory.   
  The emerging empirical studies went beyond this theoretical fragility and suggested at 
least three conditions under which macroeconomic policy coordination could be welfare 
reducing: First, for macroeconomic policy coordination to enhance welfare relative to non-
cooperative policies, policymakers—even different policymakers within a single country—must 
have similar preferences for such objectives as inflation, real economic growth (or full 
employment), exchange rates, and current-account positions.  If fiscal policy makers coordinate 
across countries, but monetary policy makers have different objectives (e.g., a primacy of price 
stability) and do not coordinate with their fiscal counterparts, the outcome need not be Pareto 
superior to the non-cooperative outcome.  Second, macroeconomic policy coordination requires 
that policy makers coordinate under the true economic model.  Coordinating macroeconomic 
policies internationally under an incorrect model may leave nations worse off relative to no 
coordination (Frankel and Rocket 1988, Holtham and Hughes Hallet 1987, Ghosh and Mason 
1987).  The gains to a single country from discovering the true economic model and moving to it 
are often greater than any gains from policy coordination.  To be sure, this information problem 
occurs in a purely autarkic setting, but then policy multipliers under both the true and false 
model typically differ by degree, not direction.  In large, open-economy models, multipliers 
often differ in terms of sign, hence coordinating under the wrong model can be destructive.  
Third—and most important—macroeconomic policy coordination can affect government 
credibility relative to the private sector with important implications for welfare.  Rogoff (1985) 
constructs an example in which coordination eliminates the exchange rate as a constraint on 
fiscal authorities’ inflation bias, thereby adversely affecting inflation expectations.  Concerns 
about the effects of policy coordination on monetary-policy credibility came to affect FOMC 
participants.   
An Analysis of the Plaza and Louvre Interventions 
  Many analysts seem to regard both the Plaza and the Louvre operations as clear examples 
of successful macroeconomic coordination and sterilized intervention, but our narrative and 
statistical evidence are less supportive.  We find some evidence that official U.S. sales of 
German marks and Japanese yen moderated dollar depreciations against these currencies, but we 
find no support for the view that intervention fosters appreciations or depreciations in a manner 
ultimately necessary to maintain target zones—a consideration particularly important for the 
assessment of intervention over this period.     22 
As suggested throughout our previous narrative, most of the movements in exchange 
rates over the Plaza and Louvre period seem attributable to policy changes, not intervention.   On 
this point, Obstfeld (1990, p. 199) seems to agree:  
“The conclusion reached is that monetary and fiscal policies, and not 
intervention per se, have been the main policy determinants of exchange rates 
in recent years [1985-88].  Pure intervention seems to have played an effective 
signaling role, in the sense of speeding desired exchange rate movements or 
impeding undesired ones, when promptly backed up by other, more 
substantive policy adjustments.  But the portfolio effects of pure intervention 
have generally been elusive enough that interventions cannot be regarded as a 
macroeconomic policy tool in their own right, with an impact somehow 
independent of short-term decision on monetary and fiscal policy.”   
  Our analysis, while not directly testing any specific channel of influence, nevertheless, 
seems more consistent with a signaling channel than a portfolio view.  By the mid-1980s, 
academic explanation of how intervention might affect exchange rates largely relied on a narrow 
signaling channel, which held that interventions signaled unanticipated changes in future 
monetary policy to the market.  The Jurgensen Report, after all, concluded that sterilized 
intervention was largely ineffective if not accompanied by supporting monetary-policy changes.  
Empirical studies of the narrow signaling channel undertaken in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
however, offered little supportive evidence.
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Over the 805 business days between 1 April 1985 and 29 April 1988, a period that 
encompasses both the Plaza and Louvre interventions, the United States sold German marks on 
33 days and bought German marks on 19 days.
  Eventually a broader concept of an expectations 
channel emerged and would henceforth guide most empirical work.  This view held that although 
foreign exchange markets were highly efficient, they were subject to temporary inefficiencies 
(see Baillie, et al. 2000, Humpage 1991).  If central banks had better information about 
fundamentals in general, they might still affect exchange rates through their intervention.  This is 
a testable proposition.   
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  Likewise over this same period, the United States sold Japanese yen on 52 days and 
bought Japanese yen on 20 days.  Only 25 of the Japanese yen sales were associated with a 
same-day dollar appreciation against the yen and only 10 of the yen purchase were associated 
with a same-day dollar depreciation against the yen.  Although the 25 successes out of 52 yen 
sales is two more than we would anticipate, the count still falls within one standard deviation of 
the expected number of successes and, consequently, seems no better than random.  Likewise, 
the 10 successful purchases of Japanese yen appear no greater than the number we would 
randomly anticipate given the variations in near-term exchange-rate movements.  These results 
for the U.S. yen interventions, like the ones for U.S. mark interventions, indicate that sterilized 
  Only 11 of the mark sales were associated with 
a same-day dollar appreciation and only 8 of the mark purchases were associated with a same-
day dollar depreciation (see table 3).  Given the variable nature of day-to-day exchange-rate 
changes, however, we expect to find that 14 of the mark sales were associated with a dollar 
appreciation and that 10 of the mark purchases were associated with a mark depreciation purely 
by chance.  The observed number of successes is no less than one standard deviation of the 
expected number, and, hence, the number of successes is no different than random.  (The 
empirical appendix explains our analytical technique.)     23 
intervention could not have maintained a target zone, since intervention could not force an 
exchange rate, once out, to return to within the target range.   
  The evidence in favor of success is slightly stronger when we define success in terms of a 
leaning-against-the-wind criterion.  Eleven of the 33 U.S. sales of German marks, for example, 
are associated with a smaller dollar depreciation against the German mark on the day of the 
intervention than occurred on the previous day.  Eleven exceeds the expected number of 
successes (five) by more than two standard deviations, suggesting that number of successes was 
not a random event.  Likewise four out of the 19 U.S. intervention purchases of German marks 
are associated with smaller dollar appreciations against the mark on the day of the intervention as 
compared to the previous day’s appreciation.  Four equals the expected number of successes plus 
two standard deviations under our leaning-against-the-wind criterion, again suggesting the 
number of successes is not a random event.  Intervention against the German mark appears to 
have moderated movements in the dollar.   
  The results for intervention against Japanese yen are similar, but a bit weaker than those 
for the German mark.  Of the 52 U.S. sales of Japanese yen, 10 were associated with a smaller 
dollar depreciation on the day of intervention as compared with the dollar’s depreciation on the 
day before the intervention.  Ten is greater than the expected number of successes, but is one shy 
of two standard deviations greater.  Of the 20 U.S. purchases of yen, two were associated with a 
smaller same-day dollar appreciation.  Two is equal to the number of successes that we would 
randomly anticipate given the volatile nature of daily exchange-rate movements.  So, with 
respect to the yen the tests at best mixed.   
  Altogether, approximately 65 percent of the U.S. interventions against either of these 
currencies appeared successful under one or the other of our success criteria.  The observed 
overall success counts—both criteria combined—were never more than two standard deviations 
above the expected number of successes, suggesting that the overall outcome was random.   
4.  The End of the Activist Agenda: 1988-1995   
Ever since the Federal Reserve System began intervening in the foreign-exchange 
market, FOMC participants had frequently questioned the effectiveness of the transactions, the 
appropriateness of the System’s involvement with the U.S. Treasury, and the operation’s 
potential for raising Congressional ire.  After the 1987 stock-market collapse, these questions 
arose anew, but now they took on a new distinctive tone: FOMC participants criticized 
intervention because they worried that the operations interfered with the credibility of the 
System’s commitment to price stability.   
By the late 1980s, the FOMC was trying to consolidate gains from its prolonged fight 
against inflation.  Discussions of monetary policy focused on building credibility and included 
such issues as: rules versus discretion, central-bank independence, and inflation targeting.  Many 
FOMC participants felt that in the absence of a legislated numerical mandate for price stability, 
anything that even suggested behavior inconsistent with that goal could damage the System’s 
integrity.  Intervention was just such a thing and attitudes soon reached a tipping point.    
The FOMC’s objections to intervention became three-fold.  First, although legally 
independent, the Federal Reserve System had little choice but to participate with the U.S. 
Treasury in major foreign-exchange operations.  This was especially true when the Treasury 
decided exchange-rate policies within G5 or G7 forums.  Consequently, intervention gave the   24 
fiscal authority leverage over an independent central bank and weakened that bank’s 
commitment to price stability.  Second, FOMC participants—recalling the Jurgensen Report—
feared that if markets interpreted sterilized intervention as a signal of future monetary-policy 
changes, intervention would create uncertainty about the System’s commitment to price 
stability.
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Stock Market Collapse  
  The dollar often appreciated when the FOMC tightened.  Consequently, the Desk 
could find itself buying foreign exchange, ostensibly adding reserves to the banking system, at 
the same time that it drained reserves through open-market operations in pursuit of price 
stability.  A third argument against intervention noted that operations to offset dollar 
appreciations and warehousing with the U.S. Treasury left the System holding foreign-currency 
assets on its books.  Losses on the foreign-exchange portfolio could lead Congress to accuse the 
System of mismanagement or, in the case of warehousing, of interfering with the appropriations 
process.  Such criticisms could lead to policies that might impinge on the System’s 
independence.   
Frictions between U.S. monetary policy and foreign-exchange intervention first heated up 
within the FOMC shortly after the 19 October 1987 stock-market crash.  On the following day, 
the Federal Reserve provided liquidity to the market and moved quickly to lower the federal-
funds-rate target by 50 basis points to 7 percent.  Over the next few weeks, the System used 
high-profile techniques to inject liquidity into the banking system (Carlson 2006).  As interest 
rates in the United States fell faster than rates abroad, the dollar dropped below 1.76 marks and 
141 yen, prompting heavy concerted intervention to support the dollar, which we previously 
explained.   
Although the Desk automatically sterilized interventions that were incompatible with its 
federal-funds-rate target, its sales of foreign exchange after the stock-market collapse seemed 
inconsistent with the FOMC’s efforts to inject liquidity into the banking system.  At the 3 
November 1987 FOMC meeting, Robert Forrestal, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta, noted the incompatibility of the Desk’s operations:  “…I find it a little anomalous that 
we are draining reserves to defend the dollar while, at the same time, we are adding reserves to 
add liquidity to the domestic economy.” (FOMC Transcripts 3 November 1987, p. 2)     
  The discussions that followed suggested that many FOMC participants wanted to focus 
on price stability and to ease out of frequent foreign-exchange interventions, but Sam Cross, an 
advocate of an activist approach, argued that the System had no choice but to intervene at the 
Treasury’s behest.  Although the Federal Reserve had independent authority for intervention, it 
was obliged to cooperate with the Treasury on international financial matters, according to 
Cross.  He described a failure to do so as a major event, one requiring prior consultation with 
Congress.  Barring Congressional approval, Cross claimed, the System’s only option was to 
attempt to influence the Treasury’s decisions about intervention from a cooperative and 
accommodating position (FOMC Transcripts 3 November 1987, p.6).  Cross seemed to echo 
Chairmen Martin’s interpretation of Federal Reserve independence: the System is independent 
within—not of—government.  This view, however, appeared inconsistent with price stability to 
many on the Committee.     
  To be sure, the conflict between monetary policy and intervention from late October 1987 
through mid-January 1988 did not seriously jeopardize the FOMC’s commitment to price 
stability.  The System eased policy to avoid a financial crisis.  The federal-funds-rate target   25 
declined, but the real federal funds rate remained little changed (see figures 3 and 4).  The 
Desk’s intervention sales of German marks and Japanese yen were at least consistent with the 
FOMC’s longer-term inflation fight.   
During the first half of 1988, intervention and monetary policy became compatible.  The 
U.S. economy proved more resilient than many thought at the time of the stock-market crash, 
allowing the FOMC to renew an anti-inflation policy thrust by March 1988.  The Desk sold 
moderate amounts of Japanese yen and German marks in brief interventions in late March and 
mid-April 1988.  So the Desk’s foreign operations appeared consistent with its domestic 
objective of draining reserves.   
  In late June 1988, however, the situation changed.  The FOMC remained concerned about 
prospective inflation and raised the federal funds rate.  The dollar began to appreciate sharply, 
especially relative to the German mark.  To moderate the dollar’s rise, the United States began a 
series of very large, very persistent purchases of German marks.  In all, between 27 June and 26 
September 1988, the Desk bought $5.1 billion equivalent German marks, a massive amount.  The 
Bundesbank sold $8.8 billion and increased its policy rates.   
Initially, FOMC participants attributed the dollar’s appreciation largely to temporary 
speculative activity, implying that the intervention would be limited and not prejudicial to the 
Committee’s inflation fight (FOMC Transcripts 29 & 30 June 1988, pp. 1-7).  As official 
purchases of marks persisted, however, the FOMC discarded this view, and its tone began to 
change.  At the 16 August 1988 FOMC meeting, Vice Chairman Corrigan unwittingly initiated a 
renewed debate about intervention when he applauded the recent interventions for curtailing the 
dollar’s rise.  This was an argument that he could not empirically substantiate.
34
  Other FOMC members, notably Governors Wayne Angel, Robert Heller, Manual 
Johnson, and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland President Lee Hoskins, argued that markets 
generally functioned well.  Governor Heller, for example, agreed that a large intervention, hitting 
a one-way market potentially could have an effect, but he worried that such an intervention 
created uncertainty, which could reduce the incentives for taking positions and could actually 
raise volatility (FOMC Transcripts 16 August 1988, p. 3).
  Corrigan 
argued that the nature of the foreign-exchange market had changed over the last few years.  The 
volume of trading had grown enormously, and program trading strategies increased the 
likelihood of one-way markets and of overshooting.  He argued that intervention “does play a 
useful role in reaffirming the fact that there are two-way markets.” (FOMC Transcripts 16 
August 1988, p. 2).   
35  President Hoskins questioned what 
a one-way market really was, other than a sustained bidding up of the price.  Why was this 
necessarily evidence of a market failure?  Hoskins allowed that markets might occasionally be 
disorderly, as in a panic or crash, but these were very infrequent events, and intervention should 
be equally infrequent.  A disorderly market argument in no way justified intervention at the 
frequency he had recently observed (FOMC Transcripts 16 August 1988, p. 4).  Governor 
Johnson, echoing to some extent Governor Angel, argued that intervention interfered with 
monetary policy:  “when we are doing consistent interventions and it’s working in the other 
direction from our open market operations, it does run the risk …of confusing the federal funds 
market as to what our reserve needs may be. … Maybe we want the two-way risk on the foreign 
exchange market, but we don’t want this uncertainty in the open market operations.” (FOMC 
Transcripts 16 August 1988, p. 5)     26 
  The United States continued to buy German marks through September 1988, but shortly 
thereafter the dollar depreciated.  From 31 October 1988 through 2 December 1988, the Desk 
sold nearly $2.0 billion worth of Japanese yen and $0.6 billion worth of German marks.  At the 1 
November 1988 FOMC meeting, President Hoskins pointed out that intervening over a fairly 
short period of time on both sides of the market suggested that the Desk knew the “right” 
exchange rate, which seemed unlikely.  This, of course, was not a new criticism, but emblematic 
of the changing views among many FOMC participants, Hoskins continued: “…by doing this I 
think we continue to confuse the public as to what our [monetary] policy is all about and divert 
attention from our long-term objective of stable prices.  And secondly, I think we run the risk of 
confusing ourselves as to our abilities to influence exchange rates in an appropriate fashion.” 
(FOMC Transcripts 1 November 1988, p. 13)  Indicative of changing attitudes, Hoskins worried 
first of all that intervention interfered with monetary policy; his secondary concern was about its 
effectiveness.   
  During the first half of 1989, the dollar once again appreciated, and the United States 
undertook an unprecedented amount of intervention, so much so, that the Desk had to request 
two inter-meeting increases in its limits on intervention (FOMC Transcripts Cross Report, 
Appendix 5, July 1989, p. 3).  The authorizations for the net-open position increased from $12 
billion to $18 billion (see figure 12).  The Desk bought $8.5 billion worth of German marks and 
nearly $7.2 billion worth of Japanese yen during the first half of the year.  Germany, which had 
been selling dollars since mid-December 1988, sold $7.2 billion.  The U.S. operations against 
both German marks and Japanese yen were split equally between the System’s and the 
Treasury’s accounts, but the System warehoused $3.0 billion worth of German marks for the 
ESF in June 1989, thereby helping to finance its interventions.  By September 1989, the 
authorization for warehousing had reached $10 billion (see figure 13).   
The real federal funds rate remained high during this time, suggesting that the FOMC 
kept a relatively tight monetary-policy stance.  Consequently these huge, Treasury directed, 
intervention purchases of foreign exchange once again appeared inconsistent with the design of 
monetary policy.  The operations also flew in the face of the Jurgensen report’s conclusions, 
which found that if domestic policies were incompatible with exchange-rate objectives, sterilized 
intervention was, at best, useless.   
  Support for the System’s involvement with the Treasury in intervention was now clearly 
evaporating.  At the 5-6 July 1989 FOMC meeting, those members opposed to foreign-exchange 
operations raised serious questions—some old, some new—about the operations.  President 
Hoskins, for example, questioned Congress’s reaction to System warehousing.  This was an old 
question, but it met with new, rather specious, responses.  Edwin Truman, Director of the 
Board’s International Division, indicated that Congress had not questioned the operation, and he 
suggested that Congress implicitly approved warehousing in the late 1960s when it allowed the 
ESF to monetize SDR’s with the System.  Cross also noted that Congress allowed the ESF to 
monetize gold flows, and suggested that warehousing foreign exchange is a modern day 
equivalent (FOMC Transcripts 5-6 July 1989, 2).  Yet, Congress explicitly authorized the 
monetization of gold and SDRs; Hoskin’s point was that Congress had never explicitly 
authorized warehousing.  Chairman Greenspan then suggested that warehousing might be a good 
thing for the System, since it allowed the Treasury to maintain their half of the now traditional 
50/50 split on intervention (FOMC Transcripts 5-6 July 1989, 2).  He did not appreciate that   27 
warehousing effectively left the System financing more than a 50 percent share, at least while the 
swap loan was on the System’s books.   
  Cross went on to say that the recent U.S. interventions—as well as German and Japanese 
operations—had largely been discrete, undertaken through a commercial bank that acted as the 
Desk’s agent.
36  He claimed that “operating visibly was not really working very effectively,” and 
that the discrete operations had been more effective.
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  Governor Angell thought that this secrecy potentially could confuse or mislead markets, 
but he also raised a new concern:  Did the bank that acted as the agent for the Desk trade on 
priority information?  Cross acknowledged that any bank with or through whom the Desk trades 
could do so.  Governor Angell then suggested that market participants would always act in their 
own self interests, implying that they might routinely bet against the Fed if they thought it 
profitable (FOMC Transcripts, 5-6 July 1989, p. 5).   
  He went on to explain that when traders 
saw the Desk attempting to support the dollar, they “hit it quickly,” selling dollars (FOMC 
Transcripts, 5-6 July 1989, p. 4).  That is, the market bet against the Desk (see Chapter 5).  
Apparently, the market no longer viewed U.S. monetary authorities as having an information 
advantage.  Instead, U.S. foreign-exchange sales had negative forecast value; that is, traders 
could make money by doing the opposite of what the System did.   
  Governor Johnson then suggested that if the Federal Reserve stopped intervening and left 
intervention solely to the Treasury, it would not make any difference.  If Cross were correct, if 
secret intervention worked better than overt operations, then the System could exit the program.  
Who would know?  Greenspan seemed to agree; Cross equivocated, but Truman suggested that 
this would be the “worst possible world.”  The Federal Reserve would lose any influence that it 
had over the operations, and the Treasury might even stop the Federal Reserve from sterilizing 
the operations (FOMC Transcripts, 5-6 July 1989, p. 8).   
  Intervention to weaken the dollar continued until mid-October.  The Desk sold $2.6 
billion German marks and $3.5 billion Japanese yen, splitting the operations equally between the 
System’s and the ESF’s accounts.  The FOMC raised the authorization of foreign currencies to 
$20 billion and the authorization for warehousing to $10 billion in late September.  The System 
warehoused an additional $4 billion worth of German marks for the U.S. Treasury, bringing the 
total to $7 billion by the end of October 1989.  Germany sold an addition $1.6 billion.   
The G7 had met in Washington D.C. in September 1989 and concluded that the continued 
appreciation of the dollar was incompatible with long-term fundamentals (Frankel 1994, p. 309).  
The FOMC began to face pressure to ease monetary policy as a means of offsetting the dollar’s 
appreciation.  This pressure only fanned the flames of concern about the conflict between 
intervention and monetary policy within the FOMC.   
  At the 3 October 1989 meeting, the debate about intervention reached a crisis stage.  As 
noted, the Desk had been buying substantial amounts of German marks and Japanese yen.  
Governor Johnson forcefully questioned Cross about how the Desk or the G7 determined the 
dollar’s fundamental equilibrium value.  It was, of course, a question that Cross could not 
answer.  Ever since Meese and Rogoff (1981, 1982, 1983), few economists had any faith in the 
ability of fundamentals-based models to forecast exchange rates at anything but a very low 
frequency.  Johnson concluded:  “Well, I realize there is a resistance to a lot of the [intervention] 
strategy here [among Committee members], but I think we ought to step up that resistance.” 
(FOMC Transcripts, 3 October 1989, pp. 2-4).     28 
  The President of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, Edward Boehne noted that the 
United States and other G7 countries were selling large quantities of dollars.  Apparently 
referring to the Jurgensen Report, he suggested that world policymakers must be contemplating 
some other more fundamental policy changes, since it was widely understood that intervention 
had only a temporary effect when not supported by other policy moves (FOMC Transcripts, 3 
October 1989, p. 4).  Within the context of a narrow signaling channel, which Federal Reserve 
staffs understood, the massive intervention implied an easing of U.S. monetary policy.   
Greenspan’s subsequent comments could not have eased the committee’s concern.  He 
noted that the driving force behind recent interventions were the U.S. Treasury and the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance.  Greenspan seemed to imply that the Treasury wanted monetary policy 
conducted within the G7 framework, meaning “essentially the G-7 would start to control 
monetary policy.”  Greenspan indicated that the Japanese Ministry of Finance and 
Undersecretary Mulford were both in favor of intervention and a lot of it.  He did not think the 
System could—or should—bring intervention to an abrupt halt, but he would try to contain the 
damage, and if the dollar appreciated abruptly—the dollar had been appreciating—he would then 
try to convince Secretary Brady that intervention was futile (FOMC Transcripts 3 October 1989, 
p. 5).   
  Governor Johnson explicitly said that the recent sales of dollars conflicted with price 
stability.  He noted that the public was beginning to believe the Federal Reserve’s—and other 
central banks’—commitment to price stability.  “For us to be countering that [the System’s 
growing credibility] with this ridiculous approach just doesn’t make sense; [it introduces] a 
potential doubt out there.  If central banks continue to participate in this kind of strategy and 
show even a compromise on it, I think to some extent the markets are going to say this is a 
joke—in fact, they [the FOMC] are balancing the goals of the current account versus price 
stability.” (FOMC Transcripts 3 October 1989, p. 6)  Corrigan disagreed that the G7 was trying 
to supplant a price stability goal with a current-account objective, but Governors Johnson and 
Angell bluntly dismissed him.   
After October 1989, U.S. intervention activity fell off, with the Desk making occasional 
one-day purchases of Japanese yen.  In late February and March 1990, however, the Desk began 
a more forceful series of yen purchases.  The Desk bought nearly $1.5 billion worth of Japanese 
yen and $200 million equivalent German marks.  All of this, except a small amount of Japanese 
yen, was for the Treasury’s account, because on 2 March 1990, the Federal Reserve unilaterally 
suspended its participation with the Treasury’s interventions.  Generally since 1980, with a few 
exceptions, the System and the Treasury had split interventions operations equally.  In refusing 
to participate, the System informed the Treasury that the System account was near its 
intervention limits and that a comprehensive review of intervention was underway at the Board 
(FOMC Transcripts 27 March 1990, p.1). 
Task Force Papers & Debate 
At their 22 August 1989 meeting, the FOMC formed a task force to undertake a 
comprehensive review of U.S. foreign-currency operations with an emphasis on System 
participation.  The objective was to provide background information to help the Committee in 
their deliberations about intervention.  The eleven Task Force papers, which the Board and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York completed for the 27 March 1990 FOMC meeting, covered 
all aspects of the System’s involvement: its legal authority for foreign currency operations, the   29 
System’s objectives, tactics, and operations, cooperation between the U.S. Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve System in this area, the various arrangements for financing intervention 
operations, its effectiveness and profitability, and intervention operations in other key developed 
countries.  Although the papers did not espouse an overt position on intervention, Cross and 
Truman (9 March 1990), who summarized the work, took a firm position in favor of continued 
intervention.   
Cross and Truman saw foreign-exchange-market intervention as providing the System 
with a policy tool that could influence exchange rates independent of monetary policy, despite 
providing no evidence to support such a claim.  They did not describe intervention as a response 
to a market failure, but claimed instead that policy makers “no longer can expect that exchange 
rates will take care of themselves…in ways that U.S. policy would like or find acceptable with 
respect to conditions in the domestic economy.” (p.12).
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Yet, the emerging consensus of empirical studies offered little support for Cross and 
Truman’s assertions.  As part of the Task Force papers, Edison conducted a comprehensive 
review of the post-1982 intervention literature.  A polished and published version appeared as 
Edison (1993).  Edison (1993) found—once again—no new evidence in favor of a portfolio-
balance channel, implying that intervention did not provide monetary policymakers with an 
independent instrument for affecting exchange rates.  Sterilized intervention could at best have a 
short-run effect through an expectations channel.  In addition, evidence as to whether 
coordinated intervention was more effective than unilateral intervention appeared disturbingly 
inconclusive.  Bordo and Schwartz (1991), Humpage (1988), and Obstfeld (1990) concluded that 
the intervention episodes since 1985 were, by and large, unsuccessful in terms of their effects on 
dollar exchange rates.   
  They asserted that monetary policy 
could not ignore exchange rates and that the “Federal Reserve’s active participation has been 
constructive both in terms of U.S. exchange rate policy and U.S. macroeconomic policy.” (p.13)  
Moreover, Cross and Truman did not find evidence that inappropriate exchange-rate 
considerations or international (G7) understandings on exchange rates had subverted Federal 
Reserve monetary policy (p. 13), and they noted that the lack of empirical support for 
intervention did not mean that the operations were ineffective (p. 14).  Finally, Cross and 
Truman advocated holding foreign-exchange balances because they enabled the United States 
“…to respond to exchange market developments without changes in U.S. monetary and other 
policies when such changes are not deemed appropriate for domestic objectives.” (p. 18).   
Debate Renewed  
If the Task Force papers were meant to assuage FOMC participants’ concerns about 
intervention, they were a dismal failure.  Since the beginning of 1989, at a time when the FOMC 
maintained a tight monetary policy, the Desk had purchased over $24 billion equivalent in 
foreign exchange, with roughly half for the System’s account, through the largest, most 
protracted operations ever, and all at the Treasury’s initiative.  Intervention in this magnitude, as 
President Boehne noted, was not consistent with calming market disorder but smacked of 
exchange-rate manipulation (FOMC Transcripts 27 March 1990, p. 47).    
The huge volume of intervention also was affecting the quality of the System’s balance 
sheet.  Foreign exchange was becoming an extraordinary share of Federal Reserve assets, 
implying that a growing amount of an inferior form of collateral—foreign exchange rather than 
Treasuries—backed the System’s reserves.  To the extent that the Desk held an open position,   30 
these foreign-exchange reserves exposed the System to valuation losses should the dollar 
appreciate.  Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond President Robert Black suggests that there were 
at least two dangers associated with holding a large portfolio.  One peril is that the System’s 
credibility with respect to price stability would be undermined because the market might expect 
the System to ease policy to avoid a dollar appreciation and huge losses on its portfolio.  The 
other threat is that Congress might try to persuade the System to ease policy to avoid big losses 
(FOMC Transcripts 27 March 1990, p. 55).    
Governor Johnson worried that this heavy intervention could create uncertainty in the 
open market, which could complicate the System’s ability to sterilize the interventions.  Johnson, 
who did believe that sterilized intervention could sometimes be effective in the short-to-
intermediate term, wanted the FOMC to cut off the intervention at some point and to refuse to 
warehouse foreign exchange for the Treasury.  Markets, he claimed, would understand (FOMC 
Transcripts 27 March 1990, pp.  49-55).   
Chairman Greenspan now portrayed the Federal Reserve as the voice of reason in the 
whole affair.  He feared that if the System continued to unilaterally refuse to intervene, it would 
lose influence over the Treasury’s intervention activities; he was “quite fearful of what they 
might do if we weren’t there to harass them toward some degree of sensibleness.”  He viewed the 
current Treasury and most previous Treasuries as “heavy interventionists.” (FOMC Transcripts 
27 March 1990, pp. 46-57).  President Hoskins, however, turned this argument on its head, 
arguing that intervention gave the Treasury influence over the Federal Reserve.  Hoskins agreed 
that the System could sterilize transactions, but contended that under current arrangements, the 
Treasury nevertheless influenced the size of the System’s portfolio (FOMC Transcripts 27 
March 1990, p. 49).  President Corrigan, in support of the Chairman, argued that not only would 
the System lose power over the Treasury, but the System would lose international stature, 
notable in the G7 (FOMC Transcripts 27 March 1990, pp. 57-59).   
After a lengthy discussion, Chairman Greenspan noted that the “vast majority” of the 
FOMC seemed in favor of continued System participation with the Treasury in intervention.  He 
agreed to confront the Treasury about the recent size of intervention, but he noted that if the 
System confronted Treasury about intervention in general, it would surely lose in Congress.  
Greenspan then recommended that the FOMC increase the warehousing limit to $15 billion and 
the overall net open position to $25 billion.  He agreed to Johnson’s request to refuse to 
participate in an intervention designed to drive the dollar down (FOMC Transcripts 27 March 
1990, pp. 69-70).   
Some FOMC members, however, wanted to set a limit on intervention.  President of the 
St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Thomas Melzer then suggested that the System inform the 
Treasury that the current intervention amounts were a limit and that the FOMC did not want to 
see more intervention.  Greenspan, however, thought that the Treasury might interpret such a 
warning as a threat, and he again warned that the System could not prevail against the Treasury 
in this matter (FOMC Transcripts 27 March 1990, pp. 70-71).  Hoskins agreed that the System 
should participate with the Treasury to some degree, but objected to the current size of the 
System’s involvement—$25 billion.  He recommended a “Treasury/Fed Accord II” before the 
position becomes much larger (FOMC Transcripts 27 March 1990, pp. 77).    
At this meeting, the FOMC voted to increase the authorization for foreign exchange from 
$21 billion to $25 billion effective immediately.  Three members dissented:  Governor Angell,   31 
President Hoskins, and President LaWare.  The FOMC also voted to increase the authority for 
warehousing from $10 billion to $15 billion, and the same three individuals dissented.  The 
Treasury’s warehousing reached $9 billion in June 1990.   
At roughly this same time, however, the Treasury’s attitude about foreign-exchange 
intervention inexplicitly seemed to change.  The extent to which complaints within the FOMC 
influenced the Treasury’s perception of intervention is not clear.  Nevertheless, on an 11 April 
1990 conference call with FOMC participants, Chairman Greenspan reported how Treasury 
Secretary Brady recently told the G7 that after spending $40 billion to defend the Japanese yen, 
he (Brady) had concluded that, “It just doesn’t work.”
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The Treasury also took steps to ease System concerns about its balance sheet.  Beginning 
on 29 May 1990, the Desk began quietly selling German marks from the Treasury’s account.  
The objective was to sell $2 billion equivalent marks by July 1990 and to use the dollar proceeds 
of those sales to buy back German marks that the Treasury had warehoused with the Federal 
Reserve.  The Desk sold $1 billion equivalent of these marks in the market and sold $1 billion 
equivalent marks off-market to a central bank (Bulletin October 1990, pp. 821-822, FOMC 
Transcripts Appendix p. 5).  The Treasury currently had $9 billion warehoused with the System, 
but by July 1990 it reduced that amount to $7 billion.  The ESF also began buying back Special 
Drawing Right (SDR) certificates from the System, and selling the SDRs to IMF members that 
needed them to make payments to the IMF.  The ESF then used the acquired dollars to draw 
down warehousing commitments to the Federal Reserve.  By the 13 November 1990 FOMC 
meeting, the amount warehoused had dropped to $2.5 billion.   
 (FOMC Transcripts 11 April 1990, p.1)  
Brady would no longer offer the Japanese support for the yen.  The Economic Report of the 
President for 1991 was the last one—at least through 1996—that mentioned foreign-exchange 
intervention.   
As intervention abated, President Hoskins, who viewed price stability as the sole 
objective of monetary policy, now took aim at its ancillary mechanisms: warehousing and swap 
lines.  He suggested lowering the warehousing authorization from $15 billion.  Hoskins also 
questioned why the System offered Mexico a swap line (see below).  He noted that the other 
countries had AA (or better) ratings on their debt and widely convertible currencies.  The swaps 
to Mexico were like foreign aid or a loan and did not match the traditional purpose for the swap 
lines.  At the 18 December 1990 FOMC meeting, Hoskins questioned the renewal of the entire 
swap mechanism since the System now held a substantial portfolio of foreign-exchange reserves 
(FOMC Transcripts 18 December 1990, p. 1).  At the 5 February 1991 meeting, Cross 
recommended lowering the authorization for warehousing from $15 billion to $10 billion, noting 
that the Treasury never exceeded $9 billion.  President Hoskins argued that if the FOMC 
supported this new limit—instead of letting the facility run dry—it was essentially endorsing the 
idea of warehousing for the Treasury.  Hoskins viewed warehousing as a loan to the Treasury, 
which violates the principle of central bank independence.  The President of the Kansas City 
Federal Reserve Bank Roger Guffey asked for a $5 billion limit (FOMC Transcripts 5 February 
1991, pp. 3-4).  The FOMC would not lower the authorization to $5 billion for another year.   
At the 26 March 1991 FOMC meeting, with many FOMC participants attempting to roll 
back the System’s authorization for holding foreign exchange and, therefore, its commitment to 
intervention, Cross championed holding a large portfolio.  At that time the System held $17.8 
billion equivalent German marks and $6.9 billion equivalent Japanese yen.  A large portfolio, 
Cross claimed, gave the System more flexibility when it intervened.
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the System need not depend on foreign sources of foreign exchange.  Moreover, the market knew 
that the System had substantial funds for intervention, which reduced destabilizing speculation 
and, therefore, lessened the chances that the System would have to use them.  He noted that the 
portfolio did expose the System to exchange-valuation losses, but this ultimately affected only 
the profits that the System returned to the Treasury.  He claimed that “if we simply adopted a 
conscious policy of getting rid of a substantial part of our reserves, it seems to me that that could 
be seen by the market and by foreign officials and by the general public as a move by the United 
States toward withdrawal of its role in international responsibilities and its role in helping to 
maintain the stability and smooth functioning of the [international financial] system.”  (FOMC 
Transcripts 26 March 1991, pp. 8-9).   
Governor Mullins asked what the conceptual basis was for determining the appropriate 
level of reserve holdings, but Cross did not have a good reply. Chairman Greenspan noted that 
borrowing was an alternative.  President Hoskins then recalled that in late 1987 and early 1988, 
when concern over intervention started, the System held reserves of only about $10 billion.  At 
the time, most FOMC participants thought that intervention was of little use, but agreed that 
holding some reserves signaled international cooperation and “show[ed] the flag.”  Hoskins 
contended that there was no rationale for accumulating reserves since that time, and he cautioned 
that the exposure (the dollar was now appreciating, forcing losses on the portfolio) and continued 
warehousing could create problems for the System.   
In early 1991, reducing the System’s portfolio through sales of foreign exchange was 
difficult because the dollar was appreciating.  At a 24 June 1991 conference call, Cross revealed 
that the United States had worked out a plan with the Bundesbank to reduce U.S. holdings of 
German marks by DM10 billion.  The transactions would be at market rates, but would be 
conducted off-market.  The first exchange of DM4 billion was scheduled for 25 June 1991.  Six 
more exchanges of DM1 billion each would follow over the next six months, with each priced at 
forward rates prevailing on 25 June 1991.  Sixty percent of the marks came from the System’s 
portfolio and 40 percent from the Treasury’s.  The transactions would exceed the daily and inter-
meeting limits on intervention, and were cleared with the Chairman and with the Subcommittee 
in accordance with the procedural instructions.  Following a question from Hoskins, Cross 
indicated that this arrangement implied no future obligation to intervene.  Hoskins continued to 
recommend lowering the authorization to hold foreign currencies (FOMC Transcripts 24 June 
1991, pp. 3-6).   
Renewed Conflicts with the Treasury   
Despite the Treasury’s changing views on intervention, the United States continued to 
intervene after mid-1990, although the amount and frequency of these operations declined 
substantially.  Often the United States undertook the operations largely out of a spirit of 
cooperation with its allies and less out of a concern for exchange rates.  By and large, the FOMC 
seemed content with the operations, until August 1992.   
That summer, the dollar fell sharply against the German mark as interest rate spreads 
between Europe and the United States widened substantially.  In July 1992, for example, the 
Bundesbank’s discount rate reached 8.75% while the Federal Reserve’s discount and federal 
funds target rates were lowered to 3% and 3.25% respectively.  The mark moved to the top of the 
ERM while the Italian lira and British pound reached the bottom.  Markets expected a 
realignment of the ERM, especially given that the Danes had rejected the Maastricht treaty.     33 
Although the dollar fell against the German mark, the United States did not view this as a 
dollar problem, one requiring heavy concerted intervention with the Europeans.  The United 
States did, however, intervene in concert with the Europeans on three occasions in late July and 
early August when the market seemed disorderly.  The Desk’s sales of German marks were fairly 
large, totaling $800 million equivalent, and they seemed to surprise private-market participants.  
Federal Reserve Bank of New York President McDonough claimed they were successful, 
although the dollar continued to depreciate against the mark through August.  On 11 August 
1992, however, Treasury Secretary Brady called for lower interest rates, which caused the dollar 
to fall and appeared to sabotage the intervention (FOMC Transcripts 18 August 1992, 
McDonough Appendix, pp. 1-7).   
At the 18 August 1992 FOMC meeting, questions arose again about the purpose of the 
intervention and about its implication for monetary policy credibility, since it involved buying 
dollars when the FOMC was easing.  McDonough claimed the Treasury was interested in 
managing an exchange rate, but that the Desk was only interested in maintaining orderly markets 
(FOMC Transcripts 18 August 1992, p.2).  Then Atlanta President Robert Forrestal captured the 
sentiment against intervention within the FOMC (FOMC Transcripts 18 August 1992, p. 3):  
“I’ve heard the rationale of disorderly markets, but I feel constrained to say that I 
was extremely surprised at this intervention, particularly the second and the third 
operations.  Of course, I would respect the judgment of the Desk and Bill 
[McDonough] with regard to whether the markets were in fact disorderly.  But 
we’ve had extensive discussions over the last year or so in the Committee on the 
effectiveness of sterilized intervention, and I thought it was the sense of this group 
that, unless we were going to follow intervention with some kind of substantive 
monetary policy move, intervention was not the policy of this committee.  What 
really compounds the problem with respect to our credibility is having 
intervention and then having that followed by the Secretary’s statement that he’s 
looking for lower interest rates.  That to me made us look extremely silly, to put it 
lightly.”   
Chairman Greeenspan attempted to put the operation in a better light, noting that “we’re 
all pretty much aware that there is very little intervention can do in and of itself to affect the 
average of any exchange rate over a particular period of time.”  But, he contended that on 
occasion the market breaks down and “the evidence does suggest that when that occurs we in 
fact can affect the market.  …markets feed on themselves, get out of hand, and sometimes create 
some degree of instability.”  (FOMC Transcripts 18 August 1992, p. 5) 
On 21 and 24 August 1992, as the dollar moved lower against the German mark, the U.S. 
Treasury asked the Desk to arrange a coordinated intervention.  The Desk advised against the 
intervention, but the Treasury insisted.  After consulting Chairman Greenspan, the Federal 
Reserve decided that it had to act in concert with the Treasury because the market might learn 
that the Treasury and System were at odds over intervention at a time when the dollar was low 
relative to the German mark (FOMC Transcripts 6 October 1993, McDonough’s Statement 
Appendix pp.1-2.).  Essentially the Federal Reserve had little choice in the matter, if the 
Treasury wanted to intervene.  None of the subsequent interventions seemed successful.   
The disintegration of the European Monetary System had prompted these interventions.  
The EMS was created in 1979, but the member countries had undertaken no currency   34 
realignments since January 1987, despite substantial differences in their economic performances.  
After easing fiscal and monetary policy to facilitate the re-unification of the country, Germany 
had recently been tightening to avoid the inflationary consequences of its earlier policies.  
German interest rates were very high, which caused difficulties for some EMS countries that 
were experiencing weak economic growth.  Amid heavy speculation, Italy devalued the lira on 
13 September 1992.  On 16 September 1992, Britain and Italy pulled out of the ERM, while 
Ireland, Spain, and Portugal imposed exchange controls (FOMC Transcripts 6 October 1992, 
McDonough Appendix, pp. 1-8).  The Germans did not want to hold the ERM together; they 
wanted more flexibility to pursue domestic-policy objectives (FOMC Transcripts 6 October 
1992, p. 2).   
The focus then shifted to the Japanese yen.  On 27 April 1993, the United States sold 
$200 million equivalent yen in an operation largely designed to show cooperation with the Bank 
of Japan rather than a commitment to intervention.  The yen was under strong upward pressure, 
and according to Margaret Greene, Manager of the Foreign Desk, “market participants were 
doubtful that the Japanese authorities could be effective until other governments signaled they, 
too, were concerned about the movement in the exchange rate.”  The market expected that 
upcoming trade talks between the United States and Japan would be confrontational and the 
dollar depreciated sharply against the yen.  At the Treasury’s suggestion the Desk intervened 
openly in several rounds, during the day.  The amounts were split evenly between the Treasury’s 
and the System’s accounts (FOMC Transcripts 18 May 1993, Greene Appendix pp. 3-4).   
Chairman Greenspan offered that the recent intervention was a response to spillover 
effects from the exchange market to other financial markets, which implied a lack of confidence 
in the dollar.  The FOMC had earlier suggested that such a spillover was a necessary condition 
for intervention (FOMC Transcripts 18 May 1993, pp. 4-5).  Further interventions against 
Japanese yen followed in late May, early June, and August 1993, although they remained fairly 
isolated events.   
On 29 April and 4 May 1994, the Desk sold both German marks and Japanese yen from 
both the System’s and Treasury’s accounts.  These operations were fairly large, totaling $ 0.7 
billion and $1.3 billion, respectively.  Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland President Jerry Jordan 
asked what the participants in the operation intended to signal through the intervention, and he 
noted Germany’s lack of enthusiasm for the operation.  (Germany bought only $250 million 
dollars on a single day, whereas Japan bought $1.6 billion on consecutive days between 28 April 
and 4 May.)
41
The Desk again sold $1.3 billion German marks and $1.3 billion Japanese yen in early 
November 1994.  Japan participated, buying nearly $1.7 billion, but Germany remained out of 
the market.  At the 15 November 1994 FOMC meeting, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 
President Broaddus argued against intervention because it must interfere with the System’s 
monetary-policy independence:   
  The object according to Peter Fisher was to communicate with both inter-bank 
traders and the broader financial markets that the dollar had gone beyond levels justified by 
fundamentals and to underline a change in policy (FOMC Transcripts 17 May 1994, pp. 1- 4).   
“As you said, Mr. Chairman, it is now widely agreed that sterilized 
intervention doesn't have any sustained impact on exchange rates unless it 
sends a signal that we are going to follow it up with a monetary policy action.  
This implies, for me at least, and this is really the heart of the matter, that it is   35 
not really possible for the Fed to maintain a truly independent monetary policy 
for an extended period of time while following the Treasury's lead on foreign 
exchange policy.  Now, of course, in reality the way I see this is that we have 
maintained our independence by not making a commitment to follow 
interventions with monetary policy actions.  But that's not a perfect situation 
either.”   (FOMC Transcripts 15 November 1994, p. 49).   
In 1995, the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond articulated the case against intervention 
(Broaddus and Goodfriend 1996).
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Although sterilized intervention had no direct impact on the monetary base, the 
Richmond exposition argued that economists and policy makers understood—at least since the 
Jurgensen Report—that such operations were ineffective unless monetary policy supported them.  
Participation in sterilized foreign exchange operations under the Treasury’s leadership, often 
within G7 forums, must then create uncertainty about the relative weights that the System gave to 
its price and exchange-rate objectives, especially—as often was the case—when these two 
objectives conflicted.   
  Although most of the core arguments were well known to 
FOMC participants, Richmond’s perspective seemed fresh because the authors developed the 
exposition more completely and clearly than heretofore had been the case.  They focused on the 
connection between intervention and monetary-policy credibility.  Sterilized intervention and the 
institutions associated with intervention damaged the Federal Reserve’s credibility with respect 
to price stability, they claimed, because Congress had never statutorily mandated price stability 
as the Fed’s sole—or even chief—policy goal.  The System’s credibility with respect to price 
stability was purely reputation-based.  Such credibility is hard to acquire and is inherently 
fragile.  Central bank independence—keeping the System free of political influence—is the sine 
qua non of reputation-based credibility.   
Richmond also argued that the System’s portfolio of foreign exchange—acquired through 
intervention, warehousing, or foreign loans—resulted in a substitution of foreign securities on 
the System’s books for U.S. Treasury securities.  By holding these securities, the Federal 
Reserve was extending credit to foreign governments and exposing its balance sheet to market 
risk and sometimes to credit risk.  The decision to put funds at risk by extending credit to foreign 
governments was a fiscal policy action that Congress—not the Federal Reserve—should 
undertake (see also Goodfriend 1994).  The Federal Reserve’s engagement in these fiscal 
operations skirted the Congressional appropriations process, avoided Congressionally mandated 
public-debt limits and, consequently, was a misuse of the System’s off-budget status.  Congress 
had put the System outside of the appropriations process to safeguard its independence.  If any of 
these foreign-exchange operations go wrong, however, the Federal Reserve might face 
Congressional criticism and actions that could damage the System’s independence.   
By 1994, many FOMC participants were leaning hard towards very little involvement.  
McDonough suggested that withdrawing from intervention or not renewing the swap lines was 
isolationist, and would have a big impact (FOMC Transcripts 15 November 1994, p. 52).  
Governor Kelly suggested that it would signal a lack of financial management and arrogance on 
the part of the Fed to thumb its nose at the Treasury and the Government, and it might get 
Congress involved (FOMC Transcripts 15 November 1994, p. 53).  In contrast, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis President Stern agreed that the cost of intervention was an erosion of 
credibility (FOMC Transcripts 15 November 1994, p. 54).  President Broaddus then dissented on 
a vote to renew the swap lines.      36 
The System intervened occasionally in 1995, but after August of that year, U.S. 
intervention effectively ended.  The System bought $833 million equivalent Japanese yen on 17 
June 1998 in an isolated transaction and bought $1.3 billion euros on 22 September 2000.  
Neither operation was successful.  Since that time, the System has wisely eschewed intervention.   
Analysis of Post-Louvre Intervention.  
  The U.S. interventions during the early 1990s were again largely ineffective at moving 
dollar exchange rates in a manner consistent with calming market disorder.  Only about 64 
percent of the intervention successfully altered exchange rate movements.   
Over the 2,318 business days between 2 May 1988 and 19 March 1997, the United States 
sold German marks on 44 days and bought German marks on 111 days (see table 4).  Twenty-
two of the U.S. sales of German marks were associated with same-day dollar appreciations, and 
54 of the U.S. purchases of German marks were associated with same-day dollar depreciations.  
In both cases, the observed number of successes was not statistically greater than the number of 
successes that we would expect to observe given the variable nature of day-to-day exchange-rate 
changes.  Likewise, six of the 44 U.S. sales of German marks were associated with a slowing in 
the pace of the dollar’s depreciation and 17 of the U.S. purchases of German marks were 
associated with a slowing in the pace of the dollar’s appreciation.  Again, however, in neither 
case was the success count statistically different than the number that we would randomly 
anticipate.  U.S. intervention against German marks was not obviously successful at achieving 
common, measurable outcomes consistent with calming disorderly markets.   
Over the same time interval, the United States sold Japanese yen on 31 days and bought 
yen on 87 days.  Fifteen of the U.S. sales of Japanese yen were associated with a same-day dollar 
appreciation, and 38 of the U.S. purchases of Japanese yen were associated with a same-day 
dollar depreciation.  As with the German mark, in both cases, the observed number of successes 
was not statistically different than the number of successes that we randomly anticipate.  Eight of 
the U.S. sales of Japanese yen were associated with a moderation in the pace of the dollar’s 
depreciation, and 14 of the U.S. purchases of Japanese yen were associated with a moderation in 
the pace of the dollar’s appreciation.  Both of these success counts exceeds the amount one 
would predict given the variable nature of daily exchange-rate movements, but only the former—
eight out of 31 sales of yen—is statistically greater than the expected amount.   
5. Swaps, Warehousing, and the Mexico Peso Crisis  
  Support for foreign-exchange-market intervention within the FOMC waned after the U.S. 
stock-market collapse in 1987 because the committee increasingly viewed such operations as 
inconsistent with a credible commitment to price stability.  As noted above, this was a fairly new 
concern, one that emerged as views about the role for monetary policy changed.  Traditionally, 
FOMC participants worried that the institutions to support foreign-exchange-market 
intervention—warehousing foreign currencies for the Treasury and swap lines—could threaten 
System independence if Congress came to view their use as a means of financing foreign-policy 
initiatives outside of the Congressional appropriations process.  Yet this problem had never 
seriously confronted the FOMC, until the Mexican peso crisis of 1995.  Then the import of these 
traditional concerns crystallized.   
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Mexican Swaps 
The Bank of Mexico first joined the Federal Reserve System’s swap network along with 
the central banks of Denmark and Norway in May 1967.
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The FOMC expanded the Mexican swap line three times during the 1970s, bringing the 
regular swap line to $700 million by 1994.  The growth of the regular swap line paralleled the 
expansion of Mexico’s foreign and domestic economic activity and a sharp rise in U.S. bank 
claims on Mexico.  In addition, the System created two special temporary swap lines prior to 
1994, which were associated with multilateral debt stabilization packages.  The first, on 28 
August 1982, gave Mexico a $325 million credit line to deal with its international debt crisis.  
The second, on 14 September 1989, offered Mexico $125 billion to aid in restructuring the 
country’s foreign bank debt.  In addition, in 1988 and 1993, Mexico and the United States 
consider additional short-term debt facilities, including an extension of the System’s swap lines, 
but both parties mutually terminated these initiatives before they came to fruition (Maroni 
1994b).   
  Mexico had maintained a reciprocal 
swap line with the U.S. Treasury since 1965, which itself replaced a much older agreement.  
During the 1960s, Mexico had experienced strong real economic growth, reasonable price 
stability, external balance, and ready access to international financial markets.  Extending the 
swap line to Mexico did not seem unusual, given the size of the Mexican economy—then larger 
than Austria or Denmark—and given the close economic ties between Mexico and the United 
States.  At the time, U.S. banks held approximately $1.3 billion in claims on Mexico (Maroni 
1994b).   
  Between 1990 and 1994, inflation in Mexico greatly exceeded inflation in the United 
States, a situation that fostered a peso depreciation.  Beginning in November 1991, however, 
Mexico maintained the peso-dollar exchange rate within moving bands that limited the pace of 
the peso’s deprecation against the U.S. dollar.  The Mexican government had negotiated the rate 
of the peso’s depreciation as part of a wage negotiation with local unions.  This arrangement left 
the peso substantially overvalued relative to the dollar on a purchasing-power-parity basis and 
produced a large and growing current-account deficit.  Foreign financial inflows associated with 
NAFTA helped to finance Mexico’s resulting deficit, which reached 8% of GDP by 1994.  Still, 
Mexican monetary authorities drew down their foreign-exchange reserves in managing the 
exchange rate (Maroni 1994a).   
  In early 1994, after concluding NAFTA and in anticipation of making the Bank of 
Mexico independent of the Ministry of Finance, Mexico requested a permanent increase in its 
swap lines with both the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury.  At the time, the peso was 
coming under strong downward pressure in part because an uprising in Chiapas raised investors’ 
concerns.  Moreover, peso devaluations had often followed Mexican elections and one was due 
in August 1994.  Mexico attempted to assuage investors’ concerns and avoid a peso depreciation 
by offering dollar-index debt (Tesobonos) instead of peso debt (Cetes).    
The proposal for an increase in the Mexican swap lines rekindled a debate about swaps at 
the 22 March 1994 FOMC meeting.  System swaps were intended to finance interventions aimed 
at calming “disorderly markets,” but Mexico presented some unusual considerations.  Mexico 
had drawn on its regular swap lines 16 times prior to 1994.  Some of these past drawings had 
merely provided temporary window-dressing for its foreign exchange reserves and some had 
offered funds in anticipation of financial-market turmoil prior to Presidential elections.    38 
Moreover, Mexico currently seemed to be defending an unviable peg.  Many FOMC 
participants—notably Alfred Broaddus, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and 
Jerry Jordan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland—did not consider such uses as 
being consistent with calming disorderly markets.  Chairman Greenspan, who claimed a 
philosophical allegiance with Broaddus and Jordan, nevertheless again argued in favor of 
cooperating with the Treasury (FOMC Transcripts 22 March 1994, pp. 2-15).   
Crisis and Questions about Appropriate Use 
Following the 24 March 1994 assassination of Mexican presidential candidate Luis 
Donaldo Colosio the United States provided a temporary increase in the Mexican swap lines to 
$6.0 billion, split evenly between the System and the ESF.
44  Canada offered a $730 million 
swap line.  On 26 April 1994, Canada, Mexico, and the United States made these temporary 
swap lines permanent as part of NAFTA.
45  All of the lines were reciprocal.  Drawings on the 
Mexican swap line would require FOMC approval, and Mexico must provide collateral to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York for swap drawings in excess of $1 billion.  The agreement 
also established a formal consultative mechanism among the NAFTA countries, which helped 
authorities monitor economic developments in Mexico.
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  Mexico must have thought that the mere existence of the swap lines would calm 
investors’ fears, since the country did not immediately draw on these lines.  The Bank of Mexico 
continued to defend the peso exchange rate out of its official reserves.  Speculators, however, 
had a one-way bet; they knew the direction that the peso would follow, only the timing was 
uncertain.  After the election, the Bank of Mexico committed large amounts of reserves to 
defending the peso and investor concerns increased.  On 20 December 1994, Mexico, with its 
dollar reserves depleted, devalued the peso and two days later allowed the peso to float.  This 
action precipitated a financial crisis.  In response to the crisis, both the ESF and the System 
temporarily increased each of their swap lines with Mexico to $4.5 billion, bringing the total 
facility to $9.0 billion.    
    
The Clinton administration asked the U.S. Congress to provide $40 billion in loan 
guarantees to Mexico, but Congress refused this request.  The U.S. Treasury, however, had 
already made contingency plans for providing financial aid to Mexico in 1993, when it feared 
that Congress might defeat NAFTA and set off financial flight from Mexico.  That plan 
envisaged offering Mexico a $12 billion credit line with $6 billion coming from the United 
States and $6 billion coming from Europe.  Half of the U.S. commitment would come from an 
increase in the Federal Reserve’s swap line with Mexico from $700 million to $3 billion (see 
Hetzel 2008, p. 208).  This time, the ESF would provide Mexico both short-term and medium-
term swaps and possibly loans and loan guarantees for a total package of up to $20 billion 
dollars.  The ESF currently held only $5 billion in liquid dollar assets and $19.5 billion in 
German marks and Japanese yen (FOMC Transcripts 31 January & 1 February 1997, pp 59-75, 
pp. 117-144).  To acquire the necessary dollars, the administration asked the System to 
warehouse up to $20 billion in foreign exchange.  (The FOMC had recently pared the System’s 
authorization for warehousing to $5 billion.)  Of that amount, the Treasury would use $6 billion 
to back the System’s own swap lines with Mexico, leaving the ESF $14 billion (FOMC 
Transcripts 31 January & 1 February 1995, p.122).  The System would warehouse German 
marks and Japanese yen, not Mexican pesos.  Truman warned that the warehousing could extend 
for ten years (FOMC Transcripts 31 January & 1 February 1995, p. 124-25).     39 
The Federal Reserve would also provide Mexico with the regular $3 billion swap line and 
with an additional $3 billion special swap line.  Mexico could draw on both lines for a 12 month 
period; the drawing would roll over every three months for up to 12 months.  At the latest, final 
payments would be due before 31 January 1997.  The Treasury, however, would have to take the 
System out of any loan after 12 months, implying that the System assumed no credit or market 
risks.  As the Bank of Mexico paid off each of the drawings, the special swap would disappear.  
While the Treasury backed up the System, Mexican oil revenues acting as collateral backed up 
the Treasury.   
At the 31 January and 1 February 1995 FOMC meeting, Governor Melzer argued that the 
Federal Reserve should only participate in the swap loans to Mexico and warehousing with 
Treasury if the situation represented a systemic risk to the U.S. financial system.  Otherwise, the 
Treasury should undertake the operations alone through the appropriations process.  He worried 
that Congress, which was not in favor of a Mexican bailout, might view warehousing on this 
scale as a subversion of its will.  Meltzer also implied that increasing the warehousing to $20 
billion might set a precedent that would continue beyond the Mexican situation when the 
Treasury might again be interested in intervention.  Moreover, if the System held additional 
German mark and Japanese yen securities on its books and sold domestic securities to sterilize 
the transactions, it would violate rules about the amount of appropriate collateral to back Federal 
Reserve notes outstanding.  Meltzer recalled this being a problem when the System was 
warehousing $9 billion (FOMC Transcripts 31 January & 1 February 1995, pp. 117-145).  
Governors Meltzer and Lindsey voted no on the measure to increase the swap line with Mexico 
and on the measure to increase the appropriation for warehousing with the Treasury.  President 
Broaddus and President Jordan, who also opposed the action, were not then voting members of 
the FOMC.   
On 31 January 1995, the Clinton administration announced a $47.8 billion Mexican aid 
package, which included $20 billion from the United States, $17.8 billion from the IMF in 18-
month stand-by credits, and a $10 billion line of credit with the BIS.  The FOMC provided $6 
billion by extending the swap lines and increased its authorization for warehousing to $20 
billion.   
That the swap and warehousing arrangements were a fait accompli did not silence debate 
among FOMC participants.  At the 28 March 1995 FOMC meeting, President Broaddus, after 
reading Truman’s memo on the System’s legal authority for warehousing, objected to the 
operation.  Broaddus contended that warehousing was a fiscal operation.  “By that I mean that in 
the end the warehousing operation has exactly the same final effect as if Congress authorized the 
Treasury or the ESF to purchase the foreign exchange and fund the purchase by issuing 
additional debt in the market.  The only difference … is that the usual Congressional 
appropriations process is circumvented, and the purchase does not show up in the budget.”  
(FOMC Transcript 28 March 1995, p. 4)  The fiscal nature arose because in the process of 
sterilizing the Treasury’s use of the dollars obtained from warehousing, the System issued 
Treasury securities from its portfolio.  Broaddus noted that the System was “off-budget,” and he 
worried that warehousing and the recent swap arrangements with Mexico suggested that the 
System was financing operations beyond the Congressional budget process that the American 
people might not favor.  He worried that this could raise Congressional ire and could threaten 
System independence (see Broaddus and Goodfriend 1996, and Goodfriend 1994).     40 
Greenspan responded:  “On the issue of how to deal with the Treasury in this 
government, as fiscal agent we involve ourselves in various types of support for the Treasury and 
that does in some sense impinge on the independence of this institution.  The trouble, 
unfortunately, is that we cannot be fully independent because there is only one government and 
there is an element here trying to draw the line.  I think we are somewhat uncomfortable about 
the warehousing facility.  I think we are all uncomfortable about our own swap line facility, and 
are in opposition to the initiatives of the Treasury.  But we also recognize that the central bank 
has very broad responsibilities to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system.”  
(FOMC Transcript 28 March 1995, p. 5).  The potential for spillover to U.S. financial markets 
became the justification for the action.   
Truman also responded to Broaddus, arguing that the Treasury could undertake 
warehousing with the market—e.g., with banks or other financial institutions—and consequently, 
Federal Reserve warehousing did not represent a breach of the fiscal authority of Congress.  
Truman went on to say that the System had changed the warehousing arrangements “so that it is 
now very clearly an arms-length, market-related transaction.”  Truman’s observation, however, 
did not sway anyone.  If the Treasury could undertake warehousing with the private sector, they 
should do so and leave the Federal Reserve out of the operations (FOMC Transcript 28 March 
1995, p. 5-6).  
In the end, the ESF never warehoused foreign currencies with the System during the 
Mexican peso crisis.  The warehousing authorization reverted to $5 billion in 1996 and has 
remained there ever since that time.  The last time that the ESF warehoused foreign exchange 
with the System was in 1992.   
Mexico drew as much as $1.5 billion on its swap lines with the System, but paid this 
amount completely down by January 1996.  The System decided to eliminate all of its swap lines 
when the euro came into existence in December 1999, except for on-going swap lines with its 
NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico.  Nevertheless, swap lines now have a long history and are 
easy to put in place, as we saw during the recent financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 and the 
European debt problems of 2010.   
8. Conclusion 
The United States stopped intervening in the foreign-exchange market primarily because 
FOMC participants believed that intervention, and the institutional arrangements associated with 
it, undermined their ability to establish and to maintain a credible commitment to price stability.  
Absent an exploitable portfolio-balance mechanism, sterilized intervention did not offer policy 
makers a means for systematically determining exchange rates independent of monetary policy.  
By the mid-1980s, support for the portfolio-balance mechanism had evaporated.  By then, most 
observers understood that for intervention to have anything more than a fleeting effect on 
exchange rates, monetary policy had to back it up, but this essentially put the cart before the 
horse from the FOMC’s perspective.  Exchange rates often responded to the overall thrust of 
U.S. monetary policy, so intervening to offset them could contravene the very policy that set 
them in motion while damaging credibility.  This became a critical problem in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s as the FOMC attempted to bring inflation expectations—then hovering in a 3 percent 
to 4 percent range—to a level more consistent with their perceptions of price stability.  
In addition, FOMC participants objected to many of the institutional arrangements for 
intervention because they threatened the System’s independence and, in doing so, also   41 
compromised the credibility of monetary policy.  The U.S. Secretary of Treasury had primary 
responsibility for U.S. foreign-exchange intervention.  He often formulated intervention policy as 
an adjunct to macroeconomic policy coordination within the G7 framework.  In doing so, he 
occasionally recommended changes in monetary policy.  The System could easily fend off calls 
for interest rate cuts, but to refuse to undertake sterilized intervention was another matter 
altogether.  Although the System had independent authority for intervention, even such strong 
chairmen as Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan were extremely reluctant to exercise their 
autonomy for fear of appearing to undermine an administration policy.  The System also worried 
that warehousing foreign exchange for the Treasury and extending swap loans at the Treasury’s 
behest to developing countries threatened its independence because Congress might view either 
of these arrangements as contravening the appropriation process.  The Mexican crisis brought 
such issues to the fore.   
Because of these concerns, the United States essentially stopped intervening by the mid-
1990s, but the U.S. policymakers never dismissed intervention as completely ineffectual.  Many 
FOMC participants accepted that the foreign-exchange market could sometimes become 
disorderly and that foreign-exchange intervention might offer a means of calming market 
disorder.  Like much of the empirical literature, we have shown that intervention does sometimes 
affect the exchange-rate movements.  Specifically, we have shown that the capacity of 
intervention to moderate exchange rate movements is greater than random, but, at best, only 
about one in five interventions are successful on this score.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the FOMC objected to the frequent and heavy interventions then underway, primarily because 
they threatened monetary policy credibility, not because they rarely worked.  Their decision to 
abandon foreign-exchange operations was a wise one.   
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Intervention (Billions of Dollars) Exchange Rate (Marks/Dollar)
Exchange Rate
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Mark Purchases
Mark Sales
Figure 1: U.S. Intervention against German Marks





Intervention (Billions of Dollars) Exchange Rate (Yen/Dollar)
Figure 2: U.S. Intervention against Japanese Yen




Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Reserve Bank of New York  
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Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Bureau of Labor Statistics
Figure 3: Real Federal Funds Rate
Percent






Figure 4: U.S. Policy Rates
Percent
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Discount Rate
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Figure 5: Nominal Short Term Rates











Figure 6: Real Short Term Rates
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Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Figure 7: U.S. Intervention against German Marks,
16 September 1985 – 6 November 1985









Figure 8: U.S. Intervention against Japanese Yen,
16 September 1985 – 6 November 1985
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Database
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Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Figure 10: U.S. Intervention against German Marks,
March 1987 – April 1988






















3/1987 5/1987 7/1987 9/1987 11/1987 1/1988 3/1988
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Figure 11: U.S. Intervention against Japanese Yen,
March 1987 – April 1988
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Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Intervention (Millions of Dollars) Real Federal Funds Rate
Figure 12: U.S. Foreign Exchange Intervention and the Fed Funds Rate
Real Federal Funds Rate
Purchases of Foreign Exchange
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Sources: Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations; FOMC Minutes of Action






Figure 14: FOMC Authorizations for Warehousing
Sources: Evolution of Formal Procedures for FOMC Oversight of System Foreign Exchange Operations; FOMC Minutes
Billions of Dollars
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Table 1: Interventions during the Minimalist Period   
  All  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
             
German marks:  25  0  4  5  8  8 
purchases  24  0  4  5  7  8 
sales  1  0  0  0  1  0 
             
Japanese yens:  11  0  5  5  0  1 
purchases  11  0  5  5  0  1 
sales  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 
Note:  Purchases or sales of foreign currencies against U.S. dollars between 20 
April 1981 and 29 March 1985.  The Desk bought only Japanese yen on 6 
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TABLE 2: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 20 April 1981 to 29 March 1985 
   
OPENING BID QUOTES 
           





EXPECTED  STANDARD  
 




SUCCESSES  DEVIATION 
German Marks   #  #  %  #  %  #  # 
Observations:  1030 
            Appreciation/Depreciation 
              sell marks  1  0  0.0  517  50.2  1  1 
buy marks  24  6  25.0  464  45.0  11  2 
total  25  6  24.0 
        Moderate Movements 
              sell marks  1  0  0.0  118  11.5  0  0 
buy marks  24  7  29.2  146  14.2  3  2 
total  25  7  28.0 
        Either Criterion  
              sell marks  1  0  0.0  635  61.7  1  0 
buy marks  24  13  54.2  610  59.2  14  2 
total  25  13  52.0 
       
                Japanese Yen  
              Observations:  1030 
            Appreciation/Depreciation 
              sell yen  0  0  na  519  50.4  0  0 
buy yen  11  4  36.4  449  43.6  5  2 
total  11  4  36.4 
        Moderate Movements 
              sell yen  0  0  na  102  9.9  0  0 
buy yen  11  5  45.5  142  13.8  2  1 
total  11  5  45.5 
        Either Criterion 
              sell yen  0  0  na  621  60.3  0  0 
buy yen  11  9  81.8  591  57.4  6  2 
total  11  9  81.8 
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TABLE 3: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 1 April 1985 to 29 April 1988 
 
  OPENING BID QUOTES 
           





EXPECTED  STANDARD  
 




SUCCESSES  DEVIATION 
German Marks   #  #  %  #  %  #  # 
Observations:  805 
            Appreciation/Depreciation 
              sell marks  33  11  33.3  349  43.4  14  3 
buy marks  19  8  42.1  421  52.3  10  2 
total  52  19  36.5 
        Moderate Movements 
              sell marks  33  11  33.3  132  16.4  5  2 
buy marks  19  4  21.1  80  9.9  2  1 
total  52  15  28.8 
        Either Criterion 
              sell marks  33  22  66.7  481  59.8  20  3 
buy marks  19  12  63.2  501  62.2  12  2 
total  52  34  65.4 
       
                Japanese Yen  
              Observations:  805 
            Appreciation/Depreciation 
              sell yen  52  25  48.1  349  43.4  23  3 
buy yen  20  10  50.0  412  51.2  10  2 
total  72  35  48.6 
        Moderate Movements 
              sell yen  52  10  19.2  111  13.8  7  2 
buy yen  20  2  10.0  84  10.4  2  1 
total  72  12  16.7 
        Either Criterion 
              sell yen  52  35  67.3  460  57.1  30  3 
buy yen  20  12  60.0  496  61.6  12  2 
total  72  47  65.3 
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TABLE 4: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION 2 May 1988 to 19 March 1997 
 
  OPENING BID QUOTES 
           





EXPECTED  STANDARD  
 




SUCCESSES  DEVIATION 
German Marks   #  #  %  #  %  #  # 
Observations:  2318 
            Appreciation/Depreciation 
              sell marks  44  22  50.0  1121  48.4  21  3 
buy marks  111  54  48.6  1100  47.5  53  5 
total  155  76  49.0 
        Moderate Movements 
              sell marks  44  6  13.6  274  11.8  5  2 
buy marks  111  17  15.3  305  13.2  15  3 
total  155  23  14.8 
        Either Criterion 
              sell marks  44  28  63.6  1395  60.2  26  3 
buy marks  111  71  64.0  1405  60.6  67  5 
total  155  99  63.9 
       
                Japanese Yen  
              Observations:  2317 
            Appreciation/Depreciation 
              sell yen  31  15  48.4  1156  49.9  15  3 
buy yen  87  38  43.7  1064  45.9  40  5 
total  118  53  44.9 
        Moderate Movements 
              sell yen  31  8  25.8  272  11.7  4  2 
buy yen  87  14  16.1  305  13.2  11  3 
total  118  22  18.6 
        Either Criterion 
              sell yen  31  23  74.2  1428  61.6  19  3 
buy yen  87  52  59.8  1369  59.1  51  5 
total  118  75  63.6 
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End Notes  
                                                 
1  The Reagan administration seemed to begin its minimalist intervention strategy in late 
February or early March of 1981.  U.S. intervention was very heavy in January 1981, but tapered 
off in February with a final heavy intervention on 22 February 1981, when President Regan was 
shot.  Treasury Secretary Donald Regan formally announced the new policy on 17 April 1981 
(see chapter 5).   
 
2  Chapter 5 discusses the inauguration of Chairman Volcker’s monetary-policy initiatives.   
 
3  The FOMC adopted monetary targets in 1970 and began making these targets public in early 
1975.   
 
4  In October 1982, the FOMC formally abandoned monetary targets for a federal funds rate 
target.   
 
5  During most of the Reagan years, the Republican Party maintained a small majority in the U.S. 
Senate, but the Democrats had a substantially larger majority in the House of Representatives.    
 
6  “Although I accept that that [a higher real return on investment] could in principle help explain 
the dollar’s strength, my judgment was that the magnitude of the decline in national saving was 
substantially greater than the increased demand for investment.”  (Feldstein 1994, p. 67) 
  
7  As chapter 4 explains, Sprinkel contended that because sterilized intervention did not alter 
fundamental macroeconomic determinants of exchange rates, it could exert only a temporary 
influence on the market at best.  He also maintained that intervention—even when sterilized—
could interfere with domestic monetary policy.   
 
8  This was the most enduring conclusion from the Report.  As we will show, FOMC participants 
referred to it, often noting that to be effective monetary policy had to back up intervention.  The 
Desk and the Treasury seemed to forget the finding.  This conclusion ultimately became the focal 
point for arguments against intervention within the FOMC.   
 
9  Solomon (1983, pp. 7-8) also discussed this problem.   
  
10  Rogoff (1984) provides a thorough survey of the empirical tests of the portfolio-balance 
model, especially of those papers important for the study of foreign-exchange intervention.  
Rogoff’s paper circulated as a memo in early 1983 and was undoubtedly part of the background 
research for the Jurgensen Report.   
 
11  We consider here only high-frequency empirical studies of the effects of intervention.  
Empirical studies of intervention profits appear in chapter 1, and early studies of intervention 
appear in chapter 5.   
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12  In 1984, the Treasury removed the withholding tax on interest paid to foreigners, which would 
have increased foreign demand for U.S. financial assets and would have encouraged a real dollar 
appreciation.   
 
13  See the collection of papers that appear in:  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas (1985) 
 
14  These congressional inquires eventually produced the Omnibus and Trade Competitiveness 
Act of 1988, which encouraged the President to pursue macroeconomic-policy coordination and 
exchange-market intervention and instructed the Treasury Secretary to analyze the exchange-rate 
policies of other countries for exchange-rate manipulation.   
 
15  These interventions were not the only interventions during the minimalist, or pre-Plaza period, 
but the intervention that began in January 1985 marked a change in the administration’s attitudes 
towards intervention.  An analysis of all pre-Plaza interventions follows in the next section.   
 
16  We do not know the exact day of this intervention because it does not appear in the Board’s 
official daily data on U.S. foreign exchange operations.   
 
17  Bagshaw and Humpage studied volatility using the moments of a stable-Paritian distribution.    
 
18  The G5 (Group of Five) consisted of France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  The G6 consisted of the G5 plus Italy.  The G7 consisted of the G6 plus Canada.   
 
19  Volcker had this assessment of exchange markets: “I was pretty well convinced by then 
[August 1985] as a matter of market judgment that the basic direction of the dollar was lower.  
Certainly, the growth of the U.S. economy seemed to be losing momentum, and if there was to 
be any change in monetary policy it would likely be toward greater ease and lower interest rates.  
But the prospects for a lower dollar were not so clear to others and the dollar rebounded.” 
(Volcker and Gyothen, 1992, pp. 242-243). 
   
20  A reprint of the Plaza communiqué can be found in Funabashi (1988, 261-6).  The text 
references paragraph 18.   
 
21  Volcker and Gyohten (1992, p. 244 ) also indicate that the United States proposed a 10-12 
percent appreciation of foreign currencies relative to the dollar.   
 
22  We are not sure to which market—Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo, or all three—the term “Far 
East” refers.  
 
23  We assess the impact using our criteria below.   
 
24  Feldstein (1986) does find a somewhat faster yen depreciation after the Plaza, but attributes to 
shift in policy rather that the intervention.   
 
25  On 27 January 1987, the United States sold $50 million equivalent yen to demonstrate 
cooperation with Japanese authorities who had recently been buying dollars (Bulletin May 1987,   61 
                                                                                                                                                             
p. 333).  On 11 March 1987, the United States made a unilateral $30 million purchase of German 
marks.     
 
26  Funabashi (1988, pp. 45 -49) and Destler and Henning (1989, pp, 51-52) discuss this episode.  
These two accounts differ on whether Volcker had worked out an agreement with Pöhl before or 
after the Board’s vote and his threat to resign.  The text follows Destler and Henning, which is 
consistent with Volcker and Gyohten (1992, p. 274).   
 
27  The G6 Communiqué is reprinted in Funabashi (1988, pp. 279-280).   
 
28  Funabashi’s book is based on anonymous interviews participants associated with the G5, G6 
or G7 meetings.
   
 
29  Frankel (1994, p. 307) notes:  “Most knowledgeable observers surmised that probably no 
explicit quantitative range had in fact been agreed on.”  
 
30  See also Kahn and Jacobson (1989) and, for a somewhat different opinion, Obstfeld (1983). 
 
31  See Klein and Rosengreen (1991), Dominguez (1992), Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) 
 
32  The Plaza operation consisted only of sales of foreign exchange, mostly German marks, 
which the System and the Treasury split equally.  The Louvre operations consisted mostly of 
purchases of foreign exchange, although U.S. monetary authorities sometimes sold foreign 
exchange.  The Federal Reserve System financed most of the German mark operations during the 
Louvre period, while the Treasury financed most of the Japanese yen interventions.  On balance, 
the Treasury spent somewhat more than the Federal Reserve.   
33  One of the Jurgensen Report’s conclusions maintained that monetary authorities needed to 
back their sterilized interventions with appropriate monetary policies, if such operations were to 
have anything other than a fleeting affect on exchange rates.   
  
34  The dollar generally appreciated despite the repeated sales of dollars.   
 
35  The view that intervention increases exchange-rate volatility has considerable empirical 
support.  
 
36  Cross discusses discrete intervention as a tactical choice (see Chapter 4).  He did not discuss it 
as a means for avoiding a conflict between monetary policy and intervention.   
 
37  Cross explained discrete intervention: “That is to say, we operated through a bank acting as an 
agent so they—although the word does get around in some way and people who are following 
these markets closely can often tell a lot of what’s going on—we did not go in openly buying 
foreign currencies.”  (FOMC Transcripts 5 & 6 July 1989, p.3) 
 
38  The page numbers in this paragraph refer to Cross and Truman (9 March 1990).   
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39  The Transcripts do not explain how Brady determined this amount.  The Board redacted part 
of the Transcripts.  The amount may include foreign intervention amounts against yen.  Since 1 
January 1989, the United States had purchased $13 billion equivalent Japanese yen.   
 
40  Congressman Gonzales was currently threatening to hold hearings on the System’s portfolio 
of foreign exchange.   
 
41  This and subsequent Japanese interventions are from published official Japanese Ministry of 
Finance data, which we converted to dollars at prevailing exchange rates.   
 
42  The article initially appeared in the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’s 1995 Annual 
Report.   
 
43  Much of the background on Mexico’s swap lines comes from Maroni (1994a,b).   
 
44  Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond President Broaddus dissented.  
 
45  The United States also set up a $2 billion swap line with Canada.  
 
46  Texas Congressman Henry Gonzalez was highly critical of the swap lines, claiming that 
Congress never granted the Federal Reserve explicit legal authority for swap lines, and that they 
exposed U.S. taxpayers to default risk.   
 